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The acquisition of major defense systems has become a
matter of concern to the Congress of the United States and
in the eyes of the nation's populace as a whole.
As in any major research and development effort, both in
the Department of Defense and in civilian industry, early
planning and sound decision-making at the inception of a
program are key to the future success of the program.
The responsibilities and roles of the Service Components
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the initiation
of defense system acquisition must be clearly defined and
'. 11 coc Ij i .ted if the early planning and f1 ' ' king
are to be sound and effective. Current DOD policies are
tending toward clearer definition of these responsibilities
roles, but there are still Lmpr Lch should be
made
.
This thesis reviews the history of management of defense
system acquisition, presents the current procedures and
practices employed in program initiation, and concludes with
specific suggestions for streamlining certain aspects of the
system acquisition process which pertain to the initiation
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As graduate students in the first class of the Navy's
recently established Systems Acquisition Management curric-
ulum at the Naval Postgraduate School, the authors have
been given an in-depth exposure to methods and policies
currently employed by the Department of Defense in the
acquisition of defense systems. An appreciation was gained
of the importance of sound decision-making at the program
initiation stage of a new defense system acquisition. The
analysis, judgements, and recommendations upon which this
first Secretary of Defense decision is based greatly deter-
mine the soundness of this decision.
The worthwhileness of these analyses, judgements, and
recommendations is predicted, in a large part, upon the
amou - form of the interfaces 1 i - ; . ffice of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Service Components (Army,
Navy, and Air Force).
A. REASON FOR THESIS
The gradual change in national priorities towards domes-
tic issues dictates an increasing need for the efficient
usage of economic resources within the Department of De-
fense, "...this marks the first time in American history
that the defense budget, after or during a war, has returned
to its pre-war levels in real terms" (Ref. 1, p. ix). Con-
gressional interest in defense systems acquisition is

intense, so intense that in 1970 the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel, in its Staff Report on Major Weapon Systems Acquisi-
tion Process, drew the conclusion "...that Congress is fast
replacing OSD as the predominate influence upon major pro-
grams" (Ref. 2, Appendix E, p. 38). Congressional scruti-
nizes of defense budgets probe deeply and are challenging
the rationale and justification for decisions made within
the Department of Defense.
During his tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr.
David Packard instituted several management procedures
which were major departures from the practices followed by
Mr. Robert McNamara and Mr. Clark Clifford, Secretaries of
Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. A
significant change va s the establisi : t of E T^ f '• Sys-
tems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). Although the
original intent of forming the DSARC was that it would be
a temporary
. ,
present indications are that i1 LI be
continued indefinitely.
In this thesis the authors examine the procedures by
which a new major defense system acquisition is initiated.
A review of past practices in defense system acquisition
management provides a backdrop for the discussion of cur-
rent practices and finally, the authors propose suggestions
of ways to streamline and make more effective the interface
between OSD and the Service Components in the initiation
of a defense system acquisition.

B. APPROACH USED
Pertinent literature on the subject of the Development
Concept Paper and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review
Council process v.Tas assembled and subjected to extensive
study and analysis. To gain insight to current views and
problems
,
_ the authors spent a week in Washington, D.C.,
conducting personal interviews with personnel in the offi-
ces of the Secretary of Defense and the Service Components,
all of Whom were closely associated with the DCP/DSARC proc-
ess. In addition, the authors interviewed Mr. David Packard
in October 1972 to obtain his personal insights.
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II. BACKGROUND OF MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION
MANAGEMENT
A. GENERAL HISTORY
Defense systems acquisition management today reflects
two decades of effort to introduce techniques which are
capable of meeting the urgent demands of complex modern
i
defense systems. A moratorium from arms competition like
that of previous post-war periods did not occur after World
War II. Because of the actions of the Soviet Union on the
international front and to maintain its national security
and to fulfill its global commitments, the United States was
compelled to seek erful . ons (Ref. 3 9
p. 1). This need further resulted in the ever increasing
complexity of new weapons as they were introduced into the
arsenal. [n hi . the Nation '. January
1961, President Eisenhower pointed to this need when he
said, "Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action,
so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his
own destruction" (Ref. iJ ) .
In the face of these- grim circumstances, radical changes
took place in weapons technology. No comparable technologi-
cal revolution in weapons had ever occurred before (Ref. 5,
p. 7). From this technology came families of nuclear weap-
ons as well as nuclear powered submarines and surface ships.
Military research and development activities developed jet
10

and rocket engines, supersonic war planes, missiles and
satellites, along with complex electronic launching, guid-
ance, and control systems.
The increased research and development efforts of the
military services and their contractors produced weapons
of awesome complexity. Inherently, the resultant advanced
systems grew more complex with each step forward in techno-
logy. With each of these advances in technology, the cost
in terms of time, material, money and manpower increased to
the point that today a significant part of the defense bud-
get is committed to the acquisition of major defense sys-
tems. Although the dollar amount of the defense budget
appears to be increasing each year, the actual buying power
of these monies is actually \.' . s the
for sound decision-making and management in defense systems
acquisition as great, if not greater, than it has been in
prior years.
The need for better defense system management also
demanded a more efficient process for selecting systems to
be developed and produced. Defense systems normally evolve
either as a result of continuing research and development
efforts of the military -services and defense contractors
or through further engineering development of systems al-
ready in being. At some point, before formal system manage'
ment can begin, the decision must be made to develop and
produce a new system. In addition to military needs both
11

technical and economic considerations are involved in this
decision.
In order to better understand the organization that has
evolved in the Department of Defense for dealing with this
important function of system development and acquisition, it
is helpful to review the history of its growth. Prior to
World War II, the research and development activities of
the Army and Navy were at an extremely low level of effort
with no -top level organization to coordinate the programs
of the two departments. This situation was probably an im-
portant factor in the creation in June 19^0 of the National
Defense Research Committee (NDRC), a civilian organization
with authority to initiate, and with funds to support,
research and development directed a 4: creating n w apons
(Ref
. 6, p. 105) •
The establishment of NDRC was a constructive and essen-
tial step toward an immediate and effective applic; n of
science and technology to the art of warfai . Since World
War I, because of limited funds, the military services had
done little toward applying science and technology to war-
fare and weaponry. However, in this same period the scien-
tific progress of our country had developed enormously.
Increasing numbers of universities engaged in research in
the physical sciences with a corresponding increase in our
nation's contribution to scientific knowledge. Industry
had similarily created a dynamic technology directed at
12

applying the new knowledge of science to the civilian life
and economy.
In 19*11, the NDRC was replaced by the Office of Scien-
tific Research and Development (OSRD). This organization
was the top authority and operating agency of the civilian
scientific and technologic effort. OSRD's general functions
were to advise the President about the status of scientific
research relating to national defense and measures necessary
to assure continued and increasing progress in this field.
It had authority and funds, it could initiate research
leading to weapons, and it could carry the development to
the stage of operating models which were tested and evaluat-
ed by the War and Navy Departments. These Departments were
the final ju of the military v; of the new develop-
ments. Those which the departments considered of adequate
military value were standardized and contracts were let for
their producti.cn. Most of the res< jects that OSRD
sponsored and supported were undertaken at the request of
the Army or Navy.
During World War II, the Army and Navy rapidly expanded
their own organizations for research and development. In
addition to their role of decision-making on programs
initiated by the OSRD, the two services initiated their own
programs which were largely carried out in the laboratories
and facilities of industry.
In the five year period from 19^0 to 19^5, the Nation's
expenditures for defense research and development expanded
13

from a modest $30 million to approximately $600 million.
While at the time this increase may have appeared to be
excessive, R&D accounted for a mere ,h% of the. total nation-
al defense spending of $152.7 billion in FY 19^5 (constant
CY 1958 prices) (Ref. 1, p. ii). However, due to this
rapid expansion of military R&D and the existence of war
conditions, little attention was given to efficiency and
economy. With the rapid and general demobilization of the
1
Armed Forces in 19^6, OSRD was discontinued and the pro-
grams under its cognizance were assigned to the Army and
Navy as appropriate.
The disbanding of OSRD at the end of World War II
created a void in the relationship between the military and
scientific communities and poi; Dblem of improving
military R&D coordination between the Army and Navy. In
June 19^46, as an outgrowth of a joint committee study pro-
posed by N James V.
and Development Board (JRDB) was es1 'shed. This board
was the first organizational body fully authorized to act
as a "command" agency on research and development matters
common to both services (Ref. 6, p. 35).
The National Security Act of 19^7 created the National
Military Establishment which included the Department of the
Air Force. It also established the basic mechanisms for
more centralization of R&D control at the newly established
Secretary of Defense level. The Secretary of Defense was
given broad responsibility for effecting coordination of
m

certain activities of the military departments which among
others included the elimination of unnecessary duplication
in a number of areas, including research and development.
The National Security Act of 19^7 replaced the Joint
Research and Development Board with the Research and Develop-
ment Board (RDB) which was to be the vehicle by which the
Secretary of Defense would oversee all military R&D. The
RDB was tasked with several significant functions: develop-
ing a master annual R&D plan; providing guidance to the
military departments in formulating their programs to imple-
ment the plan; continuously reviewing and analyzing R&D
facilities; making budget recommendations for the defense
R&D program as a whole; and assigning to one service com-
ponent the primary r\ Lbility for an entire R&D prcgr;
when unnecessary duplication could be eliminated, efficiency




creased the power of the RDB by giving it the authority to
coordinate R&D rather than merely recommend such coordina-
tion and it provided the Board Chairman with the power .of
decision-making on matters which fell within the jurisdic-
tion of the Board.
The Board functioned through committees of military
men and civilians. Each committee focused on a special
area, e.g. electronics, aeronautics, and had panels to deal
with more specific areas of interest. The effectiveness of
the RDB suffered from the inherent weaknesses of the
15

committee approach. The committees frequently tended to
involve themselves with problems faced by counterpart
groups within the military services. Despite deficiencies,
the RDB during its six years of existence, accomplished a
considerable degree of coordination, exchange of information
among the services and industry, and eliminated some of the
duplication which previously existed in defense R&D. These
accomplishments were a significant move in the direction of
more effective management of R&D in the Department of
Defense
.
With the reorganization of the Defense Department in
1953, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Development replaced the Research and Development Board.
The duties of this Assistant Sec. i ry in brief were :
1. To advise the Secretary of Defense on the research
and development aspects of the Department of Defense poli-
cies, programs, and pla] Including ca] al and operati
budgets
2. To assure that there was a sound and integrated R&D
program in the Defense Department.
3. To ensure that the R&D program was geared closely
to current strategy, which meant close contact with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for close coordination with all
Government and non-government organizations on all R&D that
might affect national defense.
The service components were responsible to this execu-
tive for the planning and execution of R&D programs with his
16

primary function being that of review to ensure that the
service plans and activities were conducted in an overall
coordinated, sound, and integrated manner. The 1953 legis-
lation also created the position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Applications Engineering). This executive was
charged with preparing DOD policies and procedures to assure
that military weapons systems would meet the objectives of
"application engineering" as they passed from research and
development into production. The lack of clear lines of
responsibility between the functions of the two assistant
secretaries reduced the effectiveness of each. This situa-
tion continued to exist, despite several attempts to resolve
the confusion, until 1957 when their functions were merged
"' ito the single position of Lstant Secretary c ' i se
for Research and Development.
The next reorganization of the Department of Defense
came about in 1958. This act increased the
status of the top defense D&R manager. The Assistant Secre-
tary was renamed Director of Defense Research and Engineer-
ing (DDR&E) and ranked sixth in the Defense Department after
the Secretary, his Deputy and the three Service Secretaries.
He became the principle advisor to the Secretary of Defense
on matters of science and technology. He also supervised
all R&D activities within DOD, including their direction and
control through centralized management. In these areas,
DDR&E recommended policies and guidance on DOD planning and
program development and on programs to fill gaps and to meet
17

national objectives. The office of DDR&E has continued as
a prime mover of R&D within the Department of Defense
.
Actual control of defense R&D has varied in recent
years depending largely upon the management style of the
Secretary of Defense. The two somewhat different approaches
of McNamara and the Laird/Packard team are presented in
detail in the following sections.
B. MCNAMARA APPROACH
When Robert S. McNamara became the Secretary of Defense
in January 1961, President Kennedy charged him with deter-
mining the level of forces required and insuring the support
of those forces at the least cost (] '. " . 108). With
this mandate from the President, Mr. McNamara conducted a
detailed evaluation of the numerous activities of the Depart'
ment of Defense and of his position as the top manager of
the Department. As a result of this evaluation he surmised
"...that the principal problem stai ; in the way of
efficient management of the Department's resources was not
the lack of management authority - the National Security Act
provides the Secretary of Defense a full measure of power -
but rather the absence of the essential management tools
needed to make sound decisions on the really crucial issues
of national security" (Ref. 8, p. 193).
As for the manner of management he was to employ as
Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara stated:
"...it became clear that either of two broad philo-
sophies of management could be followed by a Secretary of
Defense. He couiu play an essentially passive 'role - a

judicial role. In this role the Secretary would make the
decisions required of him by law by approving recommenda-
tions made to him. On the other hand, the Secretary of
Defense could play an active role providing aggressive
leadership - questioning, suggesting alternatives, propos-
ing objectives, and stimulating progress. This active
role represents my own philosophy of management ... I be-
came convinced that there was room for and need of this
kind of management philosophy in the Department of
Defense." (Ref . 9, p. 2)
.
Mr. McNamara was determined to be an activist leader
and not merely the judge of competing alternatives or a
negotiator among competing interest groups. In order to
perform in this manner, McNamara believed that he would
need readily at hand all of the relevant information avail-
able for the making of sound decisions and for controlling
their execution.
"Among the crucial decisions confronting i Secret; y
of Defense ... are the choices of major military forces a:.
weapons systems needed to carry out the tasks and missions
which derive from our national security objectives.
Accordingly, the pertinent Information must be so organ-
ized as to focus directly on those forces and weapons
syste . - : ness and r
cost (of a particular weapons syste
associated equipment, personnel, supplies, facilities and
funds, regardless of the particular service to which the
force element may be assigned. And in order to optimize
the allocation of resources, one needs not only the cost
of equipping these units (weapons procurement cost) but
also the cost of manning and operating them for at least
a reasonable period of years into the future (life cycle
costs)" (Ref. 8, p. 193).
In keeping with his philosophy of management and to
provide the information he considered necessary for good
decision-making, Mr. McNamara instituted several changes in
the Department of Defense which were received with mixed
emotions by OSD officials and members of the DOD components.
19

Among these changes was the introduction of the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). This system was
designed to provide the information in a form desired and
to integrate it into a single, coherent management system.
In the words of Mr. KcNamara,
"...this system serves several very important purposes:
1. It produces the annual Five-Year Defense Program which
is perhaps the most important single management tool
for the Secretary of Defense and the basis for the
arfnual proposal to the Congress.
2. It provides the mechanism through which financial
budgets, weapons programs, force requirements, mili-
tary strategy, and foreign policy objectives are all
brought into balance with one another.
3. It permits the top manag nt of the Defense Depart-
ment, the President, and the Congress to focus their
attention on the tasks and missions related to our
ation-al security ' es, rather thai: on the tasks
and missions of a particular service.
L
\
. It provides for the entire Defense Establj ;nt a
single "approved" plan, projected far enough into the




The main elements of the PPBS were the program packages,
the Five-Year Defense Program, and the use of cost-effec-
tiveness studies. With the possible exception of the five-
year program concept, these elements were not in themselves
unique. The distinctive • feature of the program packages
was that they focused on broad functional areas such as
strategic forces, continental-defense forces, and general-
purpose forces, rather than on the traditional service
categories. The Army had previously studied such an ap-
proach and the Air Force and the Navy had already developed
20

functional programs for their own use. The services had
also instituted, to a limited extent, the use of operations
research and systems analysis techniques. The. really inno-
vative feature of the PPBS was that the Secretary elected
to make the functional programs major vehicles for his deci-
sions. The Five-Year Program focused on functional cate-
gories that were broader than the responsibilities of any
single military service or department and thus tended to
shift the initiative to the Secretary.
In short, the PPBS was intended to achieve unification
of effort within DOD without causing drastic changes of the
entire organizational structure.
To augment the PPBS, Mr. McNamara also instituted a
means of analytical support which operations research and
other modern management techniques could provide on matters




tially a unit within the Office of the Comptroller, closely
associated with PPBS. In 1965, Systems Analysis was ele-
vated into a separate entity with its director becoming an
Assistant Secretary of Defense. The military services could
see that McNamara was effecting important changes in the
department quickly, and, like most long-established organi-
zations, they were not completely receptive to these sudden
changes. The rapid rise of Systems Analysis to a special




In brief, systems analysis takes a complex problem and
sorts out the "jumble" of pertinent factors. - The aim is
"to assist the decision maker by providing him with quanti-
tative estimates of the effectiveness and costs of each of
the alternative courses which he could choose" (Ref. 9>
p. 15). What proved to be the most controversial feature
of the new system was the extensive use of systems analysis
techniques to review and evaluate the force proposals of
the JCS'and the Service Components on a substantive as well
as a budgetary basis.
The combination of Mr. McNamara's management style of
being personally involved in all activities of DOD, the
introduction of PPBS, and the emphasis on the systems
analysis approach to d ;ision-makii re: reater
centralization of power at the OSD level for defense system
acquisition decisions. The military components felt
\ the ; ' kids" ; h. of
which often placed quantitative calculations above "experi-
ence" in the decision-making process.
In the area of defense system procurement, Mr. McNamara
found that a special characteristic of defense research
and development was the diversity and large number of
separately identifiable tasks and projects encompassed
within R&D. In order to "organize" these tasks and proj-
ects, they were grouped into categories which would be
meaningful from a management standpoint. The approach used
was based, in a general sense, on the phases of the
22

evolutionary process by which ideas were eventually trans-
lated into operational military hardware. The categories
selected were: Research, Exploratory Development, Advanced
Development, Engineering Development, and Operational Sys-
tems Development. Although these terms had been used pre-
viously, they were redefined.
"Research 1 constituted the effort directed toward the
deeper understanding of natural phenomena and the environ-
ment, i.e. toward the solution of basic problems, relevant
to long-term national security, in the physical, chemical,
biological, engineering, behavioral, and social sciences.
Individual research tasks were derived from analyses of the
basic needs and limits in defense technology, and from a
selection of the scientific op unities relevant to na-
tional security in future years.
"Exploratory Development" constituted the effort direct'
ed toward the a] ation of resu^. } :-:
development of materials, components, devices and subsys-
tems useful to new military weapons and equipment. The
emphasis of this category was en exploring the feasibility
of various approaches to the solution of specific military
problems.
"Advanced Development" encompassed the efforts directed
toward producing experimental hardware for feasibility test'
ing in order to determine its suitability for military use
before proceeding with the design and engineering for
actual service use. As programs moved into this, stage,
23

they could begin to be identified with specific military
applications or techniques and could, therefore, be analyzed
in depth as to their potential military usefulness. It
was also in this phase that analysis into initial cost
estimates were made to determine whether the potential
operational benefit would be worth the cost of further
development, production and deployment.
"Engineering Development" encompassed the efforts
directed toward designing defense systems or equipment
specifically engineered for service use and it was in this
phase that large commitments of resources may have been
made to a single project. Accordingly, before a system
was placed into full-scale engineering development, it was
necessary to its ; fie o] ione.l require-
ments and compare its relative cost-effectiveness with that
of other available alternatives. It v/as in this phase
that firm goals . ' re-
established .
"Operational Systems Development" encompassed the
efforts directed toward the development, test, evaluation
and design improvement of defense systems or equipment
which had been approved for production and deployment.
Once a decision had been made to proceed with production
and deployment, the project was included in the appropriate
mission-oriented program in PPBS.
Because Research and Exploratory Development involve
the search for new knowledge and techniques, specific goals,
2H

milestones and time schedules were not normally prescribed.
Accordingly, management of these categories of R&D was on
a "level of effort" basis. Decisions about specific tasks
and projects was virtually impossible from a central vantage
point and therefore reliance was placed on the military
service R&D managers for ensuring that the prescribed level
of resources was concentrated on the most promising projects
Mr. McNamara believed that it was "...extremely impor-
tant that no new major systems development be started until
the basic components and technology were in hand" (Ref. 8,
p. 152). This was one of the principal purposes of Advanced
Development. In this phase many of the major components of
new systems were developed and experimental prototypes were
also developed prior to commitment to neering
Development
.
Projects in the Advanced Development phase were managed
on a line item basis. Each project of an
individually reviewed in OSD and individually managed by
one of the services or defense agencies.
While Research and Exploratory Development were not
directly related to immediate military requirements, a full-
scale Engineering or Operational Systems Development could
only be justified in terms of its potential contribution to
national defense strategy, considering both its cost and
its military effectiveness, as well as the cost and effec-
tiveness of any other available alternatives. Mr. McNamara
maintained that too many projects were moved into Systems
25

Development work before adequate consideration had been
given to how the proposed defense system would be employed,
what it would cost, and whether its contribution to military
capability was worth the cost. In several cases, the capa-
bility of a proposed new development could have been achieved
in other ways, often by the modification or more imaginative
use of an existing defense system.
In the words of Mr. McNamara, "...in planning the R&D
program, we must consistently focus our attention on the new
or improved capabilities that are required, and not just on
the vehicles. If these capabilities can be proved through
the modification of existing vehicles or by the development
and installation of new equipment, there is no reason why
we should incur the additional cost of developing new
vehicles" (Ref. 8, p. 155).
Before a system was moved into Engineering Develoj .
it was necessary to as p:
following elements: threat, operating capabilities needed,
alternative ways of meeting the threat, size of the forces
proposed, time schedule, and probable cost of each alterna-
tive. To facilitate the determination and coordination of
these elements, McNamara instituted the Development Concept
Paper (DCP) . The DCP is discussed in detail in Section III
of this thesis.
Through the use of these categories and the varying
management techniques employed for each category, Mr.
McNamara felt that he v/as "...able to minimize the initiaticn
26

of unpromising programs and to eliminate in a more timely
manner those which are revealed to be unpromising or un-
needed as the development process unfolds" (Ref. 8, p. 156).
C. LAIRD/PACKARD APPROACH
In January 1969, President Nixon appointed Mr. Melvin
R. Laird as Secretary of Defense and Mr. David Packard as
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Laird came into the Penta-
gon with some very definite views on how the defense estab-
lishment should be operated, views formulated in the sixteen
years he was in Congress as a member of the House Appropria-
tions Committee and a vocal critic of DOD management during
McNamara's term as Secretary of Defense. Similarly, Mr.
Packard brought into OSD his ideas of how an organization as
large as the Defense Department should be managed. These
ideas were based on his successful experience as one of the
nation's leading industrialists.
The views and ideas of these two top DOD executives
were alike on many questions of defense policy but Mr.
Laird, as had been the case with Mir. McNamara and his
successor Mr. Clark Clifford, became embroiled in the Viet-
nam issue and other high level matters of national security
and strategy. Accordingly, his deputy was given the role
as the central figure in articulating and implementing the
changes they believed necessary for improving and stream-
lining the functioning of the Defense Department. In the
area of defense system acquisition, Mr. Packard stated that;
"at the outset of this administration it became clear that
27

there were many problems associated with weapon system
acquisition and that this area needed improvement" (Ref . 10)
(Appendix A)
.
Although this need for improvement was recognized early
by Mr. Packard, he chose to move somewhat slowly in order
that he might be able to survey the situation before taking
any action. He expressed a desire to experiment with and
try out on a limited basis any new practices and procedures.
Based on the experiences gained during this "trial period"
he established new policies or made modifications to exist-
ing policies rather than take sweeping changes throughout
the Department of Defense.
One of Mr. Packard's primary functions as Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense was in overseeing the acquisition of new
defense systems by assuring that the systems procured were
properly conceived, that they were absolutely necessary to
our national de . needs, and that tfhen
field, they met the established requirements.
To achieve these goals in defense procurement, the
Laird-Packard philosophy involved what Secretary Laird
called "participatory management." Mr. Packard stated,
"... decisions are likely to be better, and to be imple-
mented better, if those responsible for the implementation
are allowed to participate in making them" (Ref. 11, p. 26).
This concept of involving those ultimately responsible for
implementation in the formulation of plans and policies was
promulgated in Secretary Packard's memorandum of 28 May 1970,
28

"Policy Guidance on Major V/eapon System Acquisition."
In this memorandum, he stated that the services, those who
actually implement the programs, would be the ones who must
assume the majority of the responsibility of implementation.
Secretary Laird reemphasized this decentralization
approach to management in his statement before the Senate
Armed Forces Committee in March 1971 when he said:
"We have adopted a concept of management that is based
on participatory decision-making.... Our aim is to im-
prove both the decision-making process and also other
management activities by placing more emphasis on people
and less emphasis on elaborate procedures. When the
people who will be responsible for implementing a decision
have the opportunity to participate in making it, the
decision is likely to be better, and the people in the
organization will probably have a greater incentive for
successful implementation" (Ref. 12, p. 113)-
To facilit; '. : it at ion of this concept, the FFBS
cycle was altered so that the military services and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had a major role in the p] Lng of
force structures. Also the S;
was placed in the position of reviewer of military ns
and proposals, rather than initiator of plans as in the
McNamara era.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Commit-
tee, Mr. Laird stated:
"In the previous administration, the decision-making
process was centrally controlled, with the Systems Analy-
sis office giving independent support to the Secretary of
Defense by identifying issues, providing analyses, and
recommending decisions. In this administration, we have
encouraged greater participation by all parties concerned
...we have sought to identify more precisely the areas of
responsibility of the participants... the role of Systems
Analysis Is to stimulate and develop the uses, of analytic
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techniques throughout the Department and to encourage the
development .. .of clear analysis of issues and clear de-
lineation of alternative courses of action on them. In
this manner the issues and alternatives are clarified not
only by analysis but also by the judgement and recommenda-
tions of the military services and of the JCS.
"We have taken steps to define responsibilities more
precisely, and we believe this... will contribute to
better management. This had been done in the planning,
programming and budgeting system (PPBS), where we have
given the Military Departments more responsibility and,
at the same time, provided a clearer definition of Ser-
vice and OSD responsibilities. We have gone through the
same process in establishing procedures to be used in the
development and acquisition of new weapons" (Ref. 13,
p. 115).
The responsibility of OSD in the acquisition of new
weapons, according to Mr. Packard, consists of approving
policies, providing broad guidance to the services, evalua-
tion of how well the services are performing their R&D
functions, and, finally, the deci: Lty
for determining if a particular program should be implemen-
ted at various decision points in the acquisition. This
latter function was retained at the OSD 1
its direct relationship to the overall long-term objectives
and budget constraints of the Department of Defense.
In July 1970, The President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
issued its findings and recommendations on the operation of
the Department of Defense. The Panel noted that DOD policy
on weapons acquisition called for a single major decision
by the Secretary of Defense. This single decision consti-
tuted authorization for the commencement of a major system
development. Although this policy had served the intended
purpose of giving the Secretary greater control. over the
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start of new programs, it did have serious shortcomings.
Some of these shortcomings were
:
1. Because it v;as so difficult for a service to obtain
the decision to proceed, there was a tendency not to review
the decision once it had been made. This resulted in a
lack of meaningful review of the system during the stages
of development.
2. The single decision point led to a greatly increased
amount of justification which forced the services to con-
centrate more on studies to justify the system rather than
on the technical development of critical components of the
system.
3. The environment in which approvals were obtained
caused b] services and their cent; rs to s genuine,
but frequently over-optimistic estimates of their ability
to deal with the technical unknowns. This trend often
resulted in o\ in cost and . 'in the
development, and in some instances deficient hardware.
k. The nature of the decision inhibited future innova-
tions once the system had been approved for development
because any future changes would challenge the credibility
of the original decision. (Ref. 2, p. 13).
The Panel concluded that the single decision point con-
cept was not a viable management mechanism and recommended
that a multi-decision management system be utilized.
Three decision points were cited where the services should
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be required to obtain Secretary of Defense approval before
proceeding to the next phase of the acquisition.
Mr. Packard agreed with this recommendation of the Blue
Ribbon Panel. The vehicles by which the Secretary of De-
fense and his Deputy would be informed on matters of major
defense system acquisition were the Development Concept
Paper (DCP) and the newly established Defense System Acqui-
sition Review Council (DSARC). Implementation of these
concepts came through promulgation of Department of Defense
Directive 5000. 1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems"




III. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE*
For any defense system there exists a basic life cycle.
The system life cycle may be said to originate in the per-
ception of a need and to terminate when the system is
retired as obsolete.
The life cycle may be originated in one of two ways,
first as an outgrowth of a new need or, second, as an itera-
tion of a previous system whose life cycle is nearing com-
pletion. This latter system, to a large extent, satisfies
an Increased need (or perhaps the original need better),
whereas the new system fulfills a need which may not have
previously txisted, possibly as the result of a new scien-
tific or technological breakthrough.
In the ensuing discussion of this systi life cycle,
a "user-producer" view] d. The .
life cycle is viewed as a group of activities which are of
interest and concern to the user of the system and to the
producer of the system. The user's functions entail statin;
and developing the needs and concepts for the system and
after production, for the operational use and support of
x
Acknowledgement is given to Dr. Melvin B. Kline and
Dr. Melvin W. Lifson for granting permission to freely use
ideas from their Systems Engineering Lecture Notes (Ref. 1*0
These notes are the latest updated version of material con-
tained in Refs 15 and 16. Portions of this section are
quoted verbatim from the lecture notes.
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the system. The user provides the requirement inputs to
which the producer designs the system. The producer's
functions entail transforming the needs provided by the
user into the design, production and installation of the
system. All systems have both users and producers.
In the Department of Defense there are both internal
and external user-producer relationships. As an example
of these relationships in a Navy context, the users of the
system are the operating forces represented by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and the producer
is the Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) . OPNAV states the
operational needs and NAVMAT translates these needs into
requirements and basic design. Once NAVMAT has developed
..'tern requirements and basic design, it a: s the
role in the Navy's relationships with industry, the ultimate
producers of the systei .
This -producer : Lonshij . he
life cycle of a system. There must be extensive Interaction
between the two, particularly in the formative stages of an
acquisition, in order to ensure that the system developed
and produced actually meets the need for which it was
intended in a cost-effective manner.
When progressing from the beginning to the end of the
life cycle, there are a number of phases through which the
system must pass. In the most general sense, there are
three distinct periods - the Planning Period, the Acquisi-










































Figure 1: System Life Cycle
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the initial period in the life cycle. During this period,
the need for the system is established, operational and
systems concepts are formulated, and the feasibility and
worthwhileness of these concepts are established. The out-
put of the Planning Period is system identification and a
set of system requirements.
Planning is primarily a responsibility of the user
because of his initimate involvement in the ultimate opera-
tion and support of the system, because he is directly con-
cerned with the resources available and the needs to be
satisfied, and because he is best qualified to specify the
requirements of the operational system.
Although the user is responsible for planning in the
system life eye , m is he able to perform the planning
period activities without help from the producer, either
internal or external. Thus, during this period, the exter-
nal producers (contractors) may be ;.
internal producer (NAVMAT) who in turn assists the users
in defining system requirements.
The Acquisition Period encompasses those activities
necessary to design, test and evaluate, produce and install
the system. This period -is the prime responsibility of the
external producer. The producers must transform the system
requirements established during the Planning Period into a
model of the system, represented by a tested and evaluated
prototype and the engineering drawings, specifications, and
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data which are used to produce and install the system,
ready for the system user.
The Use Period consists of those activities required
to operate, support, and maintain the system, and finally,
to dispose of the system. This period is again the respon-
sibility of the user and thus the cycle is completed where
it began, with the user. Eventually this then leads to the
generation of new requirements and the cycle starts again.
Eacn of these periods in the system life cycle may be
divided into a number of phases and stages. The Planning
Period may be separated into two phases, Concept Formulation
and System Definition. The Acquisition Period consists of
Design, Production, and Installation Phases. The Use Period
is partitioned into four phases called 0] Sui port,
Modification, and Retirement phases.
While there is interaction between the Services and OSD
throughout the sy st
this thesis has to do with the Planning Period and the De-
sign Phase of the Acquisition Period.
A. THE PLANNING PERIOD
The Planning Period begins with information - informa-
tion about the needs for whidh the system is to be designed,
resources available, the environment in which the system
will operate, and constraints, if there are any. This in-
put information is critical because it establishes the
boundaries of the planning problem.
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The output of this period consists of a specified set
of system requirements for designing the system. These out-
put requirements are derived from the input information
through the activities which comprise the Concept Formula-
tion and System Definition Phases.
Concept Formulation is the initial phase of the system
life cycle in which efforts are directed toward identifying
and evaluating the system operational requirements in suf-
ficient 'detail to form a basis for the follow-on phase. The
requirements at this point are general in nature and develop
in the military from a threat and mission analysis. Impor-
tant factors such as systems effectiveness, technical, finan-
cial, and economic feasibility are identified on a system
basis
.
Three major decision points may be identified within
Concept Formulation:
a. Is tl sion which is requir ' "ill 1
recognized needs feasible - technologically, econo-
mically, financially, legally, politically, environ-
mentally, socially?
b. V/hat is (are) the best approach (es) (i.e., the best
system concept) for performing the specified
mission?
c. Is further development of the best approach
justified?
In the context of Navy Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) Program, the inputs to this phase are
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often in the form of Tentative Specific Operating Require-
ments (TSORs). TSORs are formal "tentative" requests from
OPNAV (user) to NAVMAT (producer) outlining the general
characteristics of a system to meet a defense need. They
are tentative in that possible systems have not been suffi-
ciently defined to make a decision whether to develop the
system. TSORs do not establish firm requirements and they
do not authorize commencement of a new development program
but they do establish a need for ne\\' or improved
capabilities
.
The producer's response to a TSOR in Navy development
is called the Proposed Technical Approach (PTA). The PTA
is prepared by NAVMAT and outlines technical approaches by
' a ] articular capability may bo achieved. PTA
serves several purposes:
1. It formally introduces technology into the proposed
system.
2. It states alternatives and outlines the various
risks involved.
3- It provides OPNAV with supporting technical and
financial information upon which to base a decision
to commence a development program.
4 . It provides, the technical and financial information
necessary for the preparation of a Specific Operat-
ing Requirement (SOR)
.
Equipped with the PTA, OPNAV is in a position to establish
a firm requirement for new or improved capabilities. Fhe
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SOR defines the performance throughout the system's operat-
ing environment and establishes the goals for reliability,
maintainability, and personnel requirements.
In response to the OPNAV SOR, NAVMAT generates a Techni-
cal Development Plan (TDP). The TDP comprises a plan for
the fulfillment of the requirements in the SOR. It is a
complete and detailed description of the effort necessary
to accomplish the development together with time arid funding
schedules. Generation of a TDP marks the end of Concept
Formulation.
B. ACQUISITION PERIOD
Upon completion of the Planning Period, the user is
equipped with the necessary information to enter the Acqui-
sition Period. As discussed earlier, this period is con-
cerned with the design, test, evaluation, production, and
installation of the system. It includes three phases - the
Design Phase, Production Phase, and the Installation Phase
(Figure 1). Discussion in this thesis is limited to the
Design Phase.
The Design Phase encompasses the portion of the Acquisi-
tion Period of the life cycle during which the major system
design cost and time occurs. The activities of the Design
Phase and its stages are intended to reduce uncertainty as
the design proceeds. The requirements specifications iden-
tified in the Planning Period are the inputs to this phase.
The output is a model of a system configuration,
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demonstrated and evaluated to meet requirements based on the
specifications generated in the System Definition Phase.
Design may be divided into five stages:
1. The Preliminary Design Stage commences with the
selection of one of the feasible design concepts for imple-
mentation. As the name implies, should the pursuit of the
chosen design concept prove to be undesirable or to have
shortcomings as it is refined during this stage, then an
alternative design may have to be explored or the undesir-
able portion of the design modified. Preliminary Design is
a finer development of the system definition process than
the Planning Period phases and considerably more information
will now become available for design review.
2. The Sngi] ?ing Do. Stage c ' s the
intensive development and design of the system and all its
subsystems. The purpose of this stage is to indicate that
specified system performance in areas of low confidence can
indeed be achieved. Major emphasis is placed on demonstrat-
ing the technical soundness of the selected preliminary
design. In large complex systems, it is often not feasible
to build an experimental model of the complete system.
Rather, such models will .often exist at equipment or lower
levels as breadboards, brassboards, wind-tunnel or hydro-
dynamic models, etc. Confidence in systems and subsystems
effectiveness and cost is increased through analysis and
test of such experimental or developmental models.
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3. With the performance requirements demonstrated to
be feasible or midified as a result of the Engineering
Development Stage, the Detail Design Stage now becomes of
paramount importance. There is considerable overlap between
these two stages with a significant detail design effort
being performed during the Development Stage. The distinc-
tion is rather one of degree and indicates primarily a shift
in emphasis.
Close attention must be paid during this stage to all
design requirements. Specific details are worked out down
to the smallest part. Analyses and tests are made to assure
that the design is producible. In addition to performance,
other system engineering considerations such as maintainabi-
lity, reliability, hi ictors, safety and tr Lng must
be included to assure that the design is operable and main-
tainable by personnel and not hazardous. Logistics design
considerations must also be incorpo] : ; so t des.1
will be supportable.
4. In the Test and Evaluation Stage, a test model or
prototype is subjected to full performance and environmental
tests under service conditions. These should also include
operational suitability, .reliability, maintainability, and
such other tests as necessary to demonstrate that the sys-
tem can be expected to meet its effectiveness requirements
under service conditions. Test and evaluation should in-
clude confirmation of design predictions and analyses and an
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assurance that tolerances and other problems of variation
will be minimized during production of the system.
5. The Production Design Stage follows the evaluation
of the test model or prototype and includes any redesign
necessary as well as the establishment of production pro-
cesses, production tooling, production and quality test
procedures and equipment.
C. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
Although the system acquisition process terminology has
undergone numerous changes, the basic life cycle evolution-
ary process, as discussed in the previous sections, by which
a need is transformed into an operational systei : Mains
essentially unchanged.
For management purposes, the life cycle of a system
has been divided into five phases (Conceptual Phase, Valida-
tion Phase, Full-Scale Development Phase, Production se,
and Deployment Phase), with a DCP/DSARC decision betwee -
adjacent stages, except for the last two phases. For
consistency, this breakdown and terminology will be used
when discussing the DCP/DSARC Process throughout this
thesis. These phases are defined as follows:
1. Conceptual Phase - This phase is conducted at the
discretion of the Service Components without specific
approval by OSD. During this phase, the technical, military
and economic bases for an acquisition program are estab-
lished through comprehensive systems studies and
^3

experimental hardware development and evaluation. It
includes the early conception of new systems and the program
execution required to provide the technology necessary to
make the concept technically feasible.
2. Validation Phase - This is the phase in which the
major program characteristics, through extensive analysis
and hardware development, are validated and is often identi-
fied with Advanced Development. It is preferred that re-
liance be placed on hardware development and evaluation
rather than paper studies, since this provides a better
definition of program characteristics, higher confidence
that risks have been resolved or minimized and greater con-
fidence in the ultimate outcome.
3. Full-Scale Development . • Lng this se,
the defense system including all of the items necessary for
its support is designed, fabricated and tested. An essen-
tial activity of the development is lua-
tion, both that conducted by the contractor and that
conducted by the Service Components.
4. Production Phase - During this phase the defense
system is produced for operational use.
5. Deployment Phase-- During this phase, the defense
system is provided to and used by operational units.
The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
program structure used in the Department of Defense is pre-
dicated upon the methods of budgeting used to fund certain
phases of the acquisition. The funding categories are
Hk

called Research, Exploratory Development, Advanced Develop-
ment, Engineering Development, and Operational Systems
Development. These five categories, which were discussed
in greater detail in Section II, are defined as follows
(Ref. 17, p. 0237):
1. Research - Research includes all effort directed
toward increased knowledge of natural phenomenon and envi-
ronment. This is the research-in-science phase.
2. Exploratory Development - This category includes
all effort directed toward solution of specific military
problems. This is the research-in-technology phase.
3. Advanced Development - Includes all projects which
have moved into the development of hardware for experimental
or operations st . This is the initial-applicatlon-o
new-technology phase.
k. Engineering Development - This category includes
those development programs beii 'vice u:
but which have net yet been approved for procurement or
operation.
5. Operational Systems Development - This is identical
with Engineering Development except that developments in
this category have been approved for production and deploy-
ment. Engineering Development and Operational Systems
Development together constitute the transfer-of-new-techno-
logy-to~production phase.
The RDT&E categories and the life cycle DCP/DSARC pro-
cess phases can be roughly related as shown in Eigure 2.
45






































The difficulty in equating these two stems from the meanings
attached to each term. With only a few exceptions, there
are no clear lines of division between each phase. Conse-
quently, Figure 2 is presented primarily to facilitate an
understanding of the general relationships between the
RDT&E categories and the DCP/DSARC phases. In the ensuing
sections of this thesis, the phases of the DCP/DSARC process
will be used in an effort to avoid confusion.
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PAPER
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara established the
Development Concept Paper (DCP) late in 196?. The DCP
resulted from his dissatisfaction with the fact that certain
previous defense systems had been carried into development
without adequate consideration being shown as to how the
system v/ould be used, its cost, and its military effective-
ness balanced against its cost. He felt that many existing
weapon systems used in a different manner or modified slight-
ly could provide the same capability which new proposed
systems would supposedly provide.
For this reason, he stated "...in planning the R&D
program, we must consistently focus our attention on the
new or improved capabilities that are required, and not just
on the vehicl s . ...
"Before a system is moved into Engineering Development,
or into any costly phase, we need to determine as precisely
as possible the threat it will face, the operating capabi-
lities we will need, alternative ways of meeting the threat,
the size of the force proposed, the time schedule to be
followed, and the probable cost of each alternative. ...
"What we needed was an overall plan which would tie all
of these elements together into a comprehensive balanced
analysis. Accordingly we inaugurated last fall a new device
which we call the Development Concept Paper ." (Ref . 8, p. 155)
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Discussing the DCP, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installation of Logistics), Barry Shillito, said "...This
management tool was instituted primarily to insure that a
comprehensive look would be taken by the Secretary of De-
fense and his appropriate principal advisors at a major
decision point on an important program, e.g., before heavy
financial resources were committed to the development of a
major program. ... Important systems are those which are
anticipated to require at least $25 million of RDT&E or
$100 million of production funds or both, are high priority,
or are otherwise important, e.g., because of unusual organi-
zational complexity or technological advancement." (Ref. 18,
P. 6)
The DCP was u .ated 1 ... iara in an i pt tc
improve decision making and implementation on important
development programs. The document was intended to increase
assurance .. :
1. The full military and economic consequences and
risks of programs were explored before they were
initiated or continued.
2. Information and recommendations on the programs were
prepared collaboratively or coordinated with all
interested parties prior to review by the Secretary
of Defense.
3. The premise and essential details of the Secretary's
decision on programs was recorded and made known to
those principally responsible for their implementation.
^9

4. An opportunity for review would be provided the
Secretary of Defense if any of the information or
premises on which his decision was based changed
substantially. (Ref. 19, p. 35)
B. INITIAL CONCEPTS
The DCP was intended to ensure that all pertinent major
management issues were raised so that the Secretary of De-
fense would be apprised of each issue. Dr. John Foster
(Director, Defense Research and Engineering) stated in 1968
"What the decision-maker would really like is to have just
one paper; short enough so that he can study it carefully;
comprehensive enough to represent the issues, facts, ar.d
analysis which are truly relevant and material to his deci-
sion; comprehensible so he can understand it; and impartial
- in that it includes the best case which can be made for
the system, and the best case which can be made against it
- all on the . base." (Ref. 20, p. 49)
The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E)
was to be responsible for the preparation and coordination
of DCPs. This assignment was made to mesh with DDR&E '
s
primary responsibility for determining feasibility, cost,
and effectiveness of proposed developments. An individual
in DDR&E was assigned as action officer and made responsible
for circulating the draft DCP among appropriate OSD and
Service offices to hammer out exactly what pertinent issues
should be included in the DCP. He obtained signatures
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from the OSD Assistant Secretaries and the appropriate
Service Secretary with their recommended alternatives and
justifications therefore. These signatures indicated that
the signers were satisfied that the issues presented were
substantive and relevant, and that from the point of view
of each of their offices, the DCP contained the best justi-
fications in support of their positions. In its final form
the DCP was presented to the Secretary of Defense for his
decision.
No formal directives were promulgated to specify the
contents of format of a DCP as it was believed that the DCP
should be a flexible document which could be changed to
meet the situation. What guidance was provided initially
was the limit a .' n of the document to 20 • or less.
However, by the end of 1968 the following general format
had unofficially evolved (Ref. 20, p. 52).
I. Ti
A. Describe in a couple of sentences what the pro-
gram is and what it's intended to do.
B. State in a sentence or two whether there is a
development issue requiring SecDef decision in
the near future and if so when, what the issue
is, and how much money is involved.
C. If there are 'other, broader issues which would
help the reader put the DCP in context and,
hence, which the reader ought to know at the
outset, state them briefly.
D. Summarize (without rationale) the recommendation
or, if you believe there are major differences
among the interested parties, state each briefly
as you understand it.
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II. THE PROBLEM AND OUR OBJECTIVES
A. Provide a brief summary paragraph (75 words or
less if possible) of why this program was start-
ed; don't discuss the program itself.
B. If program is response to a specific threat,
describe the threat (now and in future) in as
specific terms as possible, including numerical
data and, where relevant, uncertainties. Ex-
plain in very specific terms why present systems
do not (or will not) adequately meet the threat.
If, alternatively, the program is a desir-
able improvement not tied to a specific threat
(e.g., better truck engines, or better air-to-
ground munitions), describe as specifically as
possible how the new system will do the job
better.
The aim here is to make a clear, concise
statement of what's wrong (or will later be
wrong) with present system(s). If the difficul-
ty is that with present systems we can't meet
our military objectives, state this explicitly.
Hold to 2 00 words except in unusual
circumstances
.
III. P0SS±3Lk SOLD"] 10]
A. State options (if any) for dealing with problem.
B. Summarize - in tabular form if feasible and
appropriate - the key elements and features of
each possi solution, j
tem(s). .;is section should contain key per-
formance characteristics, and relative
aggregated system cost data including procure-
ment costs. There should be a cost annex show-
ing, for each option, R&D, Procurement, and
Operating Costs (by main system component where
appropriate), for the next five to ten fiscal
years, and the source of the cost data.
C. Describe, for each system being considered, the
extent to which it is expected to solve the
problem (Part II). Use numerical data wherever
possible, presented in tables where appropriate.
D. Unless self-evident, explain for each effective-
ness measure chosen, relevance to objectives.
E. Provide a summary assessment of the effective-
ness of each system being considered, both

relative to the other systems and, if pertinent,
in absolute terms as well.
IV. RISKS
A. What major parts of each system under considera-
tion remain to be developed. Briefly describe
where each stands. State the technological
risks involved in completing each development
or, if there are none, explain why (e.g., while
no engine has yet been selected for this air-
craft, the necessary performance can be obtained
from any of several engines now in wide use).
B. For each risk component, Identify the impact on
overall system performance if the performance of
the component falls short of expectations.
Where relevant, explain the dependence of total
system performance on a single technological
risk (e.g., without development of a satisfacto-
ry look-down radar, defense of the U.S. against
a sophisticated bomber threat is not feasible).
C. Unless done in A or B above, characterize the
degree of each risk (e.g., chances are good,
about even, or fc] at the systei will have
expected performance).
D. If a system has been under development for some
time, state specifically, with numerical data if
possible, how performance achieved to date com-
pc ' rlier expec ' s. If
shortfalls hi expected im-
pacts of each on final performance of system.
E. State briefly our confidence, or lack thereof,
in the latest cost estimates for R&D completions,
procurement and operating expenses. (If history
of earlier cost estimates and performance is
relevant, please discuss.) If confidence is
less than high, explain specific factors
responsible
.
F. Summarize in a few sentences the overall techno-
logical/economic risks of possible solution.
V. OTHER FACTORS
A. If, beyond the foregoing, other factors should
be considered in making a decision, briefly
state each and explain its relevance.
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VI. THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN(S), MILESTONES, AND THRESHOLDS
A. Provide a chart showing the development of each
program over time, including milestones and
decision points. Include past and expected
future development expenditures for each year,
and system performance targets.
B. In addition, if useful, briefly describe the
most critical points in each program and, unless
self-evident, explain their criticality.
C. If an important consideration, describe opera-
tional tests (and schedule) envisioned to verify
that expected performance will be achieved.
D. State cost, development schedule, and system
performance thresholds which, if crossed, should
automatically call for SecDef review of the
program.
VII. OVERALL EVALUATION
A. Briefly assess the costs and benefits of each
system under consideration, preferably display-
ing the in: Lon in tabular :"
B. Security Guidance.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIO]
A. If . f action is, or be, warranted in the




State when the next SecDef decision point (after
A above) is expected and what the issue will be.
C. Identify what information not now available
will be needed for this decision, and what is
being (or should be) done to obtain it. Also
assess likelihood that necessary information
will in fact be available when needed.
IX. NEXT DCP




The DCP was a serious attempt to bring impartiality
into decision making at all levels. Through careful estima-
tion and. evaluation of threat, operational capability, cost,
schedule, technical risk, time factors, forces, and alterna-
tives, Mr. McNamara hoped to quell the enthusiastic promises
of high performance and low cost which so seldom proved to
be valid in the acquisition process. The DCP was to estab-
lish thresholds of cost, schedule, and performance which,
when breached, would provide a basis for future program
decisions
.
"...the threshold sheet would contain figures on
technical and operational performance, such as the maximum
weight growth which would be allowed before the entire
development program is reopened for review by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, other thresholds
having to do with cost a v ." • •" "• ' are established
in . . . the DCP. . . . Wi ".. . se ecu . e sponsor!]
Military Service is fully responsible for the entire
management of the program." (Ref. 18 , p. 8)
In essence the DCP became a contract between the Ser-
vice Secretary and the Secretary of Defense.
C. THE PACKARD DCP
Subsequent to his assignment as Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Mr. David Packard continued the DCP in use as a
decision document. He made several changes in the content
and preparation procedures, some of which were quite
significant
.
One of the first actions he took was to provide the
services a narrative description of the responsibilities
of OSD and the services in acquiring major defense systems
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(Ref. 21). This was an effort to clarify the actual re-
sponsibility of these offices with respect to the DCP
process
.
Preparation of the DCP was made a responsibility of
the service components with the stipulation that there
first had to be agreement between OSD and the component on
a DCP outline. DDR&E continued to be responsible for co-
ordination of inputs.
Mr. 'Packard established the Defense System Acquisition
Review Council (DSARC), which was to meet for review and
discussion of program issues prior to forwarding the DCP to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for a decision.
He established different criteria for designating major
pre:: i he prom ted DOD Direct] . 000.1. The
designation of a major defense system could be due to any of
the following :
1. Doll' . ilue (. - cost
greater than $50 million, or estimated production
costs greater than $200 million;
2. National urgency; or




V. THE DEFENSE SYSTEM ACQUISITION REVIEW COUNCIL
A. RATIONALE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF DSARC
The Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
was established by Mr. Packard (Appendix C) after he had
served as Deputy Secretary of Defense for about six months
because he recognized the need for Improved high-level
decision-making. He hoped, by assembling around a table
the appropriate principals, to achieve a semblance of im-
partiality in the decision-making process and to avoid
blatant parochialism. There existed other equally strong
motivating factors for forming the DSARC. The tremendous
cost g ed in numerous ]
becoming public knowledge and generating very bad press for
the Department of Defense as well i
,
'eater in-depth
review by the Congrei . i re be cor ' Limit-
ed as the share of the defense budget allocated to procure-
ment shrank in terms of its buying power. All of these
factors indicated to Mr. Packard the need for a more thor-
ough and detailed analysis of the effects of risk, uncer-
tainty, and costs to the .national economy. This was
instrumental in his decision to form the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council.
B. INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE DSARC
The DSARC was intended to complement the DCP process.
Final revisions of DCPs were not to be prepared -until after
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holding a DSARC review, which would permit coordinated
evaluation and deliberation among senior managers to assure
that the advice given to the Secretary of Defense would be
as complete and objective as possible prior to a decision
to proceed to the next step in a system's acquisition cycle.
Hopefully, by assembling these principals, certain issues
would be resolved prior to passing the DCP to the Deputy
SECDEF for decision rather than forcing him to take a stand
when all of his senior advisors were taking different posi-
tions from one another on issues other than the major ones.
While Mr. Packard was a firm advocate of participatory
management, he reserved for OSD the decision-making respon-
sibility as to whether a particular program should be im-
plemented at various decision points in the life cycle
since this related to DOD's long term objectives and budget
problems. The DSARC meetings were to be used to evaluate
the mane ce cf the ! Lees in implements
;
approved policies and to make decisions on proceeding into
the next phase in each major acquisition program. The
three points in a system's acquisition cycle at which Mr.
Packard felt that a DSARC should be convened are:
1. When initiation of a program is proposed.
2. When transition from the validation phase to full
scale development is proposed.
3. When transition from development into production for
service deployment is proposed.
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If all the DSARC principals were in agreement on the
preferred alternative in a DCP, the requirement for a DSARC
review could be waived, since there would be no issues to
discuss. The reviews which were held covered all issues,
program thresholds, and other matters discussed in the DCP.
Should the need dictate (e.g., breach of a threshold) or
should the Service component request, a special DSARC
meeting could be convened.
A significant change introduced by the Packard DCP/DSARC
process was the increased emphasis placed on achieving
technical performance as well as cost and schedule goals
in one phase of the acquisition cycle before entering the
next phase. This emphasis on performance was significantly
'ferent from . . ' ;mph on cost and schedi
milestones
.
C. DSARC ATTENDEES AND FI TOMS
The DSARC is com of the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E), Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installation and Logistics) (ASD(I&L) ) , Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Systems Analysis) (ASD(SA) ) , the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or his representative,
and the Secretary of the Service Component. The Program
Manager (if assigned) attends as part of the Service Sec-
retary's contingent.
In a December 1969 memorandum (Ref. 21) to the Service
Secretaries, Mr. Packard described the responsibilities of
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the Secretary of Defense and the Services in acquiring major
defense system. (Figure 3) He delineated four degrees of
responsibility , as follow:
1. Primary responsibility - This responsibility is held
by either the Secretary of Defense or the Service Component,
depending on where the program is in the acquisition cycle,
(e.g., the Service component has primary responsibility for
a program during the conceptual phase, and SECDEP has pri-
mary responsibility for the program decision.)
2. Principal Responsibility on OSD - Held by DDR&E
from conceptual phase through full-scale development, then
passed to ASD(I&L) for production and deployment.
3. Secondary Responsibility in OSD - Held by all four
OSD offices for contribut u
i
to decision-maid process at
major program decision points.
4. Monitoring Responsibility - Held by SECDEP at all
times when he does not hold prim; '. : :ii
;
sibility. For financial purposes, monitoring responsibility
is held at the same time by ASD(C). ASD(SA) has monitoring
responsibility during the conceptual phase only.
SECDEF holds primary responsibility for the key deci-
sions at the transition between phases of the acquisition
cycle and monitors the program between decision points.
From program inception to phaseout, the Service Component
has primary responsibility for program execution in accord-
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During the Conceptual Phase, the Service Component
holds primary responsibility for identifying operational
needs and new systems to meet those needs, starting a dia-
logue with OSD on the new systems and the critical points
for decisions on those systems; identifying competing sys-
tems; conducting required analyses; conducting technology
and component development and critical experiments; pre-
paring cost and schedule estimates; and optimizing concep-
tual systems in order to arrive at a proposed system and
program.
DDR&E has principal responsibility in OSD for monitoring
the conceptual program as it evolves, and serves as the OSD
leader for the dialogue with the services on service esti-
mates of tl t, costs, risks, trade- and the pros and
cons of alternative systems. DDR&E takes the initiative
within OSD to identify major issues, the analysis of experi-
ntation required to resolve techno] ' Li: sues,
initiates DCPs that are required.
ASD(C) is responsible for monitoring the program to
assure that it stays in balance with the DOD budget and that
the proposed program budget and funding profile are
reasonable.
ASD(SA) has monitoring responsibility for evaluating the
force structure implications and for evaluating the realism
of cost estimates for the program.




The Program Initiation Decision is made by SECDEF by
means of a DCP supported by a DSARC . At this point in time,
SECDEF has the primary responsibility for making the deci-
sion whether to initiate a development program or to make
some alternative decision.
DDR&E has principal responsibility in OSD for prepara-
tion and coordination of the DCP to be used for obtaining
a SECDEF decision. DDR&E chairs the DSARC that meets to
discuss 'issues in the DCP and forwards the DCP to the Ser-
vice Component for implementation after SECDEF ' s decision.
ASD(I&L) has secondary responsibility in OSD for evalua-
ting the proposed program and decision alternatives, parti-
cularly from a standpoint of procurement, production,
facilities, and logistics, and provides his ndation
through the DCP and DSARC.
ASD(C) has secondary responsibility in OSD for evaluat-
ing the proposed program and decision alternr s, parti-
cularly from the standpoint of balance of the overall
budget and funding' profile and fair and accurate representa-
tion of the cost and funding. He provides his recommenda-
tion in the same way as ASD(I&L).
ASD(SA) has secondary responsibility in OSD for evaluat-
ing the proposed program decision alternatives, particularly
from the standpoint of force structure implication - numbers
of weapons systems needed and timing of the IOC - and the
realism of cost estimates. He makes recommendations in the
same manner as ASD(I&L).
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Additional responsibilities discussed in the memorandum
are concerned with later phases of the acquisition cycle
and are not germane to the subject of this thesis.
D. THE INITIAL DSARC
Mr. Packard provided considerable leeway in timing for
the initial DSARC, unlike the fairly narrow time span for
the DSARCs held prior to entering Full-Scale Development
and Production. In fact, where it appeared, from informal
discussion or comments on the draft DCP, that there was
agreement among the DSARC principals and the Service Secre-
tary on the same program alternative, a DSARC meeting was
not even required for the first milestone. Flexibility in
timing was in keeping with Mr. Packard's desire to keep
programs in the Conceptual Phase longer, until more .' nee
could be placed on hardware and less on paper studies. This
approach of experimental prototyping was intended to help
in the dec: i n of whai ' ,nted prior to commit-
ment of large sums to Full-Scale Development and Production.
Thus the Service Components could conduct, at their own
discretion, a considerable amount of Advanced Development
prior to requesting a DSARC. This enabled them to obtain
a firmer knowledge of areas of risk and to develop more
accurate estimates of costs involved.
The purpose of the Milestone I DSARC meeting is to
determine whether or not the Conceptual Phase has been com-
pleted and whether the program is ready to transition to
6i|

the next phase. The review is held at such time that the
developing Service has determined that:
1. The system satisfies a real military need, is worth
its cost and is of sufficient priority to be funded
within overall fiscal constraints.
2. Mission and performance requirements have been
adequately defined.
3. Major uncertainties have been identified and a
'suitable method of resolution is planned for the
Validation Phase.
h. Preliminary cost and schedule estimates are realistic
and acceptable.
5. The management approach and program planning are
sound
.
6. The DCP thresholds are well defined and provide the
flexibility for accomplishing the appropriate trade-
off; tl ilidation 1 hile in
surfacing of significant problems.
The DSARC presentation relates to the DCP, specifically
addressing the issues in the DCP and the viability of thres-
holds. It addresses the program's readiness to transition
to the next phase (i.e., 'prerequisites). The presentation
assures that the proposed program is consistent with the DCP.
Because this first review is usually conducted early in the
Advanced Development phase, less specific and accurate
information is available than would be on hand for a later
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review. Consequently, this review looks at the issues from
a broader point of view. This does not mean that this deci-
sion-point is any less important; the opposite is actually
the case. Both Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Laird
recognized that inadequate planning and review at the con-
ceptual stage of development had led to many of the overruns
and poor performance of systems encountered in recent years.
The initial DSARC is of vital importance to the entire pro-
gram. What is decided at this decision point will be re-
flected in and used as the basis for future decisions
concerning the procurement of the system.
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VI. DSARC DECISION-MAKING REQUIREMENTS
A basic asGumpticn of the authors is that there is a
fundamental decision-making and management method by which
major defense systems acquisition should be managed. In
its basic form, this method must contain elements and pro-
cesses by v/hich the following objectives can be achieved:
1. 'Key decision-making at SECDEI level . Exactly what
constitutes a key decision has been argued at length at all
levels of the Defense Department. Key decisions are few in
number and must be of sufficient importance as to warrant
the consideration and judgment of the Secretary. however,
the Secretary mu be invo] . : in tl 3 ' ' king pro-
cess frequently enough to ensure that he has some measure
of control over the progress of a program. Care must be
; be tl escalation of decisions "to the tc "
on issues which can and rightly should be made at a lower
level within the Department of Defense. Escalation of de-
cisions normally comes about either because individuals at
a subordinate level are not willing to accept the responsi-
bility for their decisions or because the top level manager
(or his staff) is in doubt as to the decision-making ability
of subordinate managers. In either case, the number of de-
cisions placed before the top level manager become greater
and control becomes more centralized. Past experiences in
DOD with centralized control have proven that this approach
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to management is essentially unworkable.
"Indeed, attempts to over centralize decision-making
at the top seriously impair the Secretary's (SECDEF)
capability to exercise effective control. Under such
circumstances far too many decisions go unmade, critical
issues are not addressed, problems are deferred and the
principal of personal accountability is lost in the con-
fused maze of 'staff coordination'" (Ref. 2, p. 21).
2. Specific assignment of responsibility . In any major
defense system acquisition there are almost countless tasks
and functions that must be performed properly and in a
timely manner in order for the acquisition to proceed.
These tasks and functions must be identified and responsi-
bility for their accomplishment must be established. When
responsibility is Initially assigned to an office or organi-
zation, it falls upon that office or organization to speci-
fically designate the individual (s ) who will be held
accountable for the accomplishment of each task. By simply
holding "the Service Component" or "OSD" responsible, the
accountability is again lost in the "confused maze of staff
coordination" as quoted earlier.
3. Proper timing of decisions . In order for the deci-
sions made by the Secretary of Defense to be effective and
to provide him with the necessary control over the acquisi-
tion of a new defense system, the timing of his decisions
is critical. If a decision is made too early It would be
based upon incomplete and possibly incorrect information
which could result in erroneous conclusions. Conversely,
if a decision is made too late, there is essentially no
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decision to be made. The alternatives are limited to the
extent that the decision becomes essentially an approval
of what is already being done. Therefore, the point in time
when the Secretary interacts in the acquisition process is
of vital importance. The variety of situations encountered
in individual acquisition programs precludes basing these
decision points on a fixed time basis. As key decisions
requiring Secretary of Defense action are defined, the
timing is predicated upon the reasons for the decisions and
what information must be available in order for the Secre-
tary to be able to make a sound decision.
Decision-making at levels below the Secretary of Defense
are equally important and must be approached in a similar
fashion. n.tifica ' of decision points, the reasons
the decisions and the information necessary to support the
decision and who is responsible for the decision must all
be addressed so thai Lsions ar ide at the proper tj
not too early nor too late.
h. Adequate monitoring and validation . The necessity
of having certain key decisions made at the Secretary of
Defense level goes without question. Although the Secretary
may delegate responsibility for the development and produc-
tion of a new defense system to a Service Component, he
retains full responsibility for providing adequate national
defense. This responsibility manifests itself in the deci-
sions he must personally make. Also the Secretary's res-
ponsibility requires that he have a means of monitoring
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program progress and for validation of Service Component
recommendations. Here too, care must be taken to prevent
the functions of monitoring and validation from becoming
control and direction. In a bureaucracy the size of the
Defense Department, there is a tendency for those charged
with the task of monitoring or validating to become suffi-
ciently powerful that they begin to control. This monitor-
ing and validation requirement is also applicable at levels
below the Secretary.
The above method for management and decision-making i£
essentially what Secretary Packard used when he issued De-
partment of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1, "Acquisition
of Major Defense Systems" in July 1971 • The process as
espoused by i ; ckard is sii le in concept and sound as
a management philosophy. It provides for key decisions to
be made by the Secretary of Defense, continues the use of
Concept P: [ DCP) 1 ' ch
issues and considerations which should go before the Secre-
tary for decision are pulled together and agreement estab-
lished between participants in a particular program, and
uses the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
as the body for reviewing_ all significant issues and consid-
erations and for making recommendations to the SECDEF. Both
the DCP and DSARC when employed in this context support the
Secretary and provide him with a monitoring and validation
capability while at the same time retaining the desirable
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features of having the Service Components responsible for
the development and procurement of defense systems.
A. ACCOUNTABILITY
As discussed in Section II, the radical difference in
management styles of Mr. McNamara and Mr. Packard serves to
emphasize the strong effect personality factors have had on
decision-making in the Department of Defense. Mr. McNamara
tended to become involved down to minute detail while Mir.
Packard concerned himself with those areas which he consid-
ered to be of greatest importance and ones that warranted de-
cision-making at the highest level. Mr. Packard
demonstrated a preference for balancing experience and anal-
ysis to obtain the best results from both approaches.
In order to achieve a balance between the analytic
approach to decision-making and the more pragmatic approach
based on the knowledge and practical experience of the i
who must employ the systems in the field, Mr. Packar felt
that greater reliance must be placed in the recommendations
of the military services. While the value of systems anal-
ysis and other disciplines in developing a new defense sys-
tem is recognized, these cannot be the sole basis for making
decisions at the Secretary of Defense level. For the most
part, the advocates of these disciplines usually lack the
practical experience with which to evaluate their analysis.
Past experience in weapons acquisition has indicated that
neglect of the views of the "men in the field" has been a
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major contributing factor in the procurement of weapons
which did not adequately meet a defense need.
Conversely, reliance solely on military experience for
decision-making is equally invalid. By giving greater res-
ponsibility to the Services for the initiation of new pro-
grams, OSD must expect the services to employ sound
analytical methods, to support and build on their military
experience. In brief, for the services to be given the
freer rein they desire in defense system acquisition, they
must rely equally on an analytic approach and application
of military judgment in developing their recommendations.
In the past and, to some extent, even now, the Service
Component which originated a proposal for a new defense
stem progra i lacke the capability for analytical valida-
tion of its proposal before seeking approval from higher-
authority . This validation should be based upon a thoroi
analysis of t issiqn and the . nt or : ans
for accomplish: the mission in light of the predicted
threat and the efforts of the other services to meet the
threat. The Services have made significant advances toward
improving their analytical capabilities through the imple-
mentation of analytic techniques.
Lack of definite responsibility has been cited as a
problem both in DCP preparation and in the Initial DSARC
review functions. When responsibility is not clearly
defined, it is not possible to have the degree of accounta-
bility necessary for proper management of a program. To be
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effective, responsibility and accountability must be placed
on an individual rather than in an organization. It is
only in this way that authority can be exercised and individ-
uals will know their functions and accept responsibility
for their actions and decisions. Today it seems that every-
one is extremely anxious to "help," but at the same time is
very unwilling to be held responsible for his actions.
Secretary Packard emphasized the need for a few good
men in m'anaging programs. He made an attempt to obtain
strong Program Managers who would be able to conduct their
programs free from interference by others and he attempted
to reduce the pressures placed upon these managers from
above, both in OSD and in the parent service. Also he
directed that the Program Managers be given greater authori-
ty and that they should be held accountable for the progress
of their programs. Mr. Packard believed that the Services
uld be held respo: ble f Lr action t the
Services should be required to improve their performance
rather than have their responsibility abrogated by estab-
lishing additional controls at the OSD level.* His efforts
in this area brought about a degree of improvement in the
performance of the Services which can be expected to continue
if OSD can resist the temptation to over-control the acqui-
sition process and instead hold the Services responsible
for their actions. A rather simple analogy would be the
Interview with Mr. David Packard, 30 October 1972
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commanding officer of a ship who does not believe the Engi-
neering Officer is performing his duties properly. The
CO. either fires the Engineer or brings pressure to bear
to cause the Engineer to fulfill his responsibilities. The
C.O. does not assume the dutues of the Engineer.
A frequent problem arising in past DSARC reviews has
been OSD ' s belief that the Services have not adequately
analyzed the threat (actual or potential) in justifying the
need for. a new program. Because of this belief, OSD is
currently proposing changes to the DSARC process so that
the threat problem can be examined at the OSD level earlier
in the life cycle of a program. If, in fact, the Services
are to be responsible for the initiation of new programs,
then OSD should hold them as' accoi ble for the thre<
analysis as for any other part of the program. Therefore,
if the Secretary of Defense is dissatisfied with the per-
formance of the Services in this area, it 1 ves him to
force the services to improve their threat analysis rather




While assembling material for this thesis, the authors
were impressed by the number of panels, commissions, studies,
conferences, and symposia v.Thich have been convened and
commissioned to study the organization of the Department
of Defense, the Service Components and the systems acquisi-
tion process. Invariably, numerous recommendations were
made by each group and occasionally a few were implemented.
The reasons that many of the recommendations were not im-
plemented are many and varied, ranging from the need for the
Congress to enact legislation to the fact that some of the
recomme] nations were so wea] thai Lmplei ntation was not
warranted.
The complex problems faced in defense systems acquisition
defy total and completely efficient ir: ment because of
the numerous goals served by the acquisition process. These
goals have resulted in the requirement that the systems
acquisition process not only meet defense needs, but at the
same time fill extensive socio-economic-political needs.
While many of these goals are beneficial to the nation as
a whole, it must be recognized that serving these goals
frequently results in increased costs and inefficiencies.
Rather than dealing with a contractor who could actually
produce the best system for the least dollars, DOD is fre-
quently required to deal with a firm which has the best
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equal opportunity record, is located in a labor surplus
area or in the state of the currently "in" congressmen,
gives out large shares of its work to small business, etc.
Then when a company which is awarded a defense contract
based on one or more of these factors is unable to perform
the contract, the Services and OSD are charged with mis-
management and ineptitude.
These comments are not made because the authors believe
these goals will ever be changed, but because they are fact.
The majority of studies and panels have skirted these issues,
and take the position that internal DOD reorganization will
miraculously improve acquisition procedures. It will not.
Mr. Packard recognized the inability of DOD to control
many of these external influences and constraints when he
promulgated his policies on acquisition. Ke made little
effort to build new organizations and empires which would
ultimately tend to increase the problems aires
in the acquisition process. Rather, he tried to b] them
down and simplify system acquisition management.
The background portion of this thesis provides ample
evidence of a long established and frequently used approach
to "improving the present system" through reorganization.
The longevity of this concept is shown by a quote from the
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report of July 1970:
"...we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing
and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion
of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and
demoralization.
"
Petrcnuis Arbiter, circa A.D. Sixty
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It is not the intention of the authors to create a fur-
ther "illusion of progress/' but to tender the following
suggestions by which the initiation of a major defense
system acquisition may be streamlined.
1. The first DSARC, Program Initiation Decision, is
requested by the Service Component when it is determined
by the Component that a major defense system program should
be pursued. This marks the end of the Conceptual phase.
This decision point is the only one during system acquisi-
tion in which the Service Components have a degree of lati-
tude in timing the request for the decision, since the
other two major decision points are firmly linked to the
Full-Scale Development and Production phases. The flexibi-
lity allowed in the timing of the Program Initiation Deci-
sion is necessary due to the wide diversity in type and
complexity of major defense system programs, i.e., some
pre ' ht push tb ''.-rate of the art" and require
extensive experimentation in order for the Service Comp
to be able to assure the Service Secretary and OSD that con-
tinued development is justified, others might be composed
mainly of off-the-shelf hardware requiring little experi-
mentation. An affirmative Program Initiation Decision is
recognition by the Secretary of Defense of a valid opera-
tional requirement for a defense system.
The initial Secretary of Defense decision should come
during the Advanced Development phase of the RDT&E program
structure (see Figure 2) as currently established in
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DODD 5000.1. To have this initial decision at the beginning
of Advanced Development or earlier would be unwise as it
could have the following implications:
a. OSD would become involved in deciding which alterna-
tives are to be pursued by the Service Components during
Advanced Development. This might eliminate some options
of high potential and could stifle innovation on the part
of the Service Components by having formal control too
early in' the procurement process. By conducting some
Advanced Development before the initial DSARC , the Service
Components are better able to address cost, schedule, and
performance of all the options under consideration.
b. Cancellation of programs which get into trouble
would be less likely to ha] . n because of th reluctance
on the part of OSD to stop a program which it had earlier
approved. The approaches being pursued would be those
selected by C nd not nee ' these selected by the
Service Component and for OSD to cancel one of its own
programs would be indicative of a poor initial decision.
(i.e., it would violate the inevitable success syndrome.)
c. The desirable results which are obtained through
competitive approaches among the Service Components would
be reduced and the stereotyped service roles would be
emphasized
.
d. The decentralization (participatory management)
philosophies of DODD 5000.1 might be severely restricted
because of the earlier OSD involvement. The Service

Components should be allowed to independently pursue in
Advanced Development those alternatives which they consider
appropriate so that unknowns may be reduced and so that
Service recommendations to the DSARC might be based on
better information.
e. Congressional concern over cost growth would con-
tinue and possibly increase because the Service Components
would be required to address technical, financial, and
effectiveness questions without having accomplished the
development prerequisite for establishment of reliable
estimates
.
On the other hand, the Service Components must recognize
the importance of requesting the initial program decision
early enoi ;3 Ln devel< nt that the Secretary of Defence
actually has viable alternatives to consider and is not
restricted to approving or disapproving one and only one
_ive, as could result fro: ' a program in
development so long that the service presents a "solution"
rather than a range of possible solutions. This delaying
tactic has allegedly been employed at times in the past
and is a contributing factor in the "credibility gap" that
currently exists between OSD and the Service Components.
Each group, OSD and the Service Components, must appreciate
the role of the other and strive for a supporting relation-
ship vis-a-vis adversary relationship. This can be accom-
plished only through mutual understanding and confidence
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that each will support the needs and responsibilities of
the other.
The authors concur with Mr. Packard's observation that
too many defense programs are formalized by the DCP/DSARC
process too early. Accordingly, procedures and funding
methods should be instituted which would allow the Service
Components to continue potential programs in the Concep-
tual phase longer so that when a program comes before the
DSARC fo'r the program Initiation decision, the decision will
be based on sound technological and cost and schedule infor-
mation. This would result in a greater expenditure of
dollars in the Conceptual phase and more alternatives would
be pursued further along before final selection is made
but by taking this approach, far better cost data, analysis
of risk and uncertainty, and schedule data would be avail-
able for each of the alternatives.
2. Although each decisj n made during the develop]
and production of a defense system is in itself important,
perhaps the most crucial single decision is the Program
Initiation Decision resulting from the first DSARC review.
This decision, of the three key decisions made at the Sec-
retary of Defense level, is based on more subjective
The need for a supporting relationship between OSD and
the Service Components in Defense Systems Acquisition is
discussed more fully in Preparation for the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council
, a thesis by LCDR W. P . .Bancroft
,
IjSU and LCDR T.S. Brady, USN, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, Calif., March, 1972.
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factors because less quantitative information is available
and because there is inherently greater risk and uncertainty
in the early stages of development of a program. As a
result, parochialism and service interests tend to become
more prevalent than later in the acquisition process when
decisions can be based on proven milestones. To reduce
the impact that individual groups or offices could have on
the direction that the council's recommendations take, the
chairman of the initial DSARC should be the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. The other OSD officials who participate should
be considered subordinate to the Secretary but equal to
each other so that no one of these officials will tend to
dominate the discussion. By being the chairman, DEPSECDEF
would hear all sides and be able to direct the discussion
toward issues which he considers must be resolved in order
to support his decision-making responsibility. He would
have .he adv< able to re ' . or bj eve
than the Assistant Secretaries whose staffs have vested
interests in the direction the council takes. Also, as
chairman, DEPSECDEF could effectively lessen much intra-OSD
and inter-service parochialism.
Recognizing that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has
many functions which place demands upon his time, the chair-
manship of the initial DSARC should be considered of suffi-
cient importance that this responsibility would not be
delegated. If this function is delegated, then the benefits
discussed above could be lost.
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3. The Service Component should be held totally res-
ponsible for the preparation of the initial DCP. Within
the Service, one individual who can be held accountable for
the quality of the contents of the DCP should be assigned
as the "program advocate." This individual must have the
background and knowledge to intelligently prepare the paper
and treat the primary issues of concern and he should be
the primary service representative on all matters having
to do with the DCP. This "program advocate" should also
be responsible for making the formal presentation at the
initial DSARC review.
Upon completion of a draft DCP, it should be distributed
simultaneously through JCS and the offices of the DSARC
principals for review and commenl . he re: Tor simulta-
neous distribution of the draft DCP is to reduce the time
required for all parties to review and comment and also to
give the Service more ind nt ap; ' 'the DCP
than are presently obtained. This should result in a better
balance of views because the comments of each reviewing
official will be based upon the Service drafted DCP rather
than the views and comments of other reviewers. The review-
ing officials, rather than revising the DCP, should indicate
their concurrence or dissent and their rationale therefor,
on a single page which would become an appendix to the DCP.
The DCP "advocate" would then consider the comments tendered
by the reviewers and those he considers valid would be
reflected in modifications to the DCP. Those comments
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which the "advocate" considers not valid would be returned
to the originator with comments supporting the decision for
not including these items in the DCP. If resolution cannot
be reached on these disputed issues prior to the DSARC, they
should be carried forward into the DSARC as issues for dis-
cussion. If revised, the new DCP should be routed again
for review.
Occasions have arisen in which the Project Manager of
a particular program has been surprised at a DSARC by issues
brought up for discussion which were not in the DCP. In
the interest of saving time and getting on with the known
issues, the DSARC chairman should limit the raising of
issues not previously included in the DCP to those issues
which are gei to the decision at hand. If an impc
new issue is raised which all parties are not equally pre-
pared to discuss, then the DSARC should be adjourned until
such time as the issue car I disc". I wit] "ledge and
understanding. If this "hard line" on what is to be dis-
cussed in a DSARC is not adhered to, the effectiveness of
the DSARC could effectively be undermined by the raising of
parochial interests or side issues or subjects which other
members had accepted as settled or not of sufficient impor-
tance to be considered at the DSARC level.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate more
actively in the DCP/DSARC process, particularly in those
interactions dealing with program initiation. Their involve-
ment currently consists mainly of identifying threats and
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military needs, a function they perform in support of the
PPB system. Rather than having the Chairman of the JCS or
his designated representative invited to attend the DSARC
reviews, the Secretary of Defense should require attendance
by three JCS representatives, specifying that each of these
representatives be from a different Service Component, and
capable of discussing in detail the need for the particular
program before the DSARC. Major defense programs are too
importan't to permit the JCS attendee at DSARC reviews to be
only from the sponsoring service as has been the case his-
torically resulting in an unintentional bias in favor of
the program, simply by virtue of the fact that the repre-
sentative has a predisposition in favor of his parent
service
.
Attendance at the DSARC by JCS members from sister
services should tend to overcome this deficiency by broaden-
- the perspective of the Council, and result in t] con-
sideration and discussion being at a national defense level,
rather than on a more parochial Service level. It should
also reduce the tendency of JCS to force a "common service
position" despite circumstances which would not warrant
this action. Strong justifiable differences concerning a
program at the JCS level should certainly be brought to the
attention of the Secretary of Defense for his consideration




In conclusion, the authors believe that although the
Defense System Acquisition procedures, as established by
DODD 5000.1, have resulted in marked improvement in the
early decision-making of a program, implementation of the
aforementioned recommendations would contribute significant-
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on it became clear that
d with weapon system
ded improvement. At that
losophy that I wanted a
tuation before taking
experiment with and try
ces and procedures and
establish the required
hanges rather than making
sions off the top of the
To study specific areas of system a Lsition I established
several panels of the IAC to help identify the prime prob-
lems that should be given priority attention. These panels
have now given me their preliminary reports and I believe
that some things are so clearly indicated that action can
be started on t] ly. The problems associated
with cost grc. n . ;:. s acquis:! fall in th
category
.
For example, from the statistics that have been prepared
and which I have furnished the Congress, the largest single
cause of cost growth is over-optimism in cost estimates for
major weapon systems. This is true both on the part of
the contractor and the Military Services. Much of this
results from the tremendous competition for programs among
contractors. It is also a product, within the Services,
of competition between programs for limited financial re-
sources. There are, of course, numerous other reasons.
I believe that the best way to change this situation within
industry is to impress firmly on Defense contractors the
need for cost realism in their proposals and the fact that
we will make this point a major factor to be considered in
source selection. This in turn will require that we make
a distinct improvement in cur DOD cost estimating and vali-
dating capability, as well as insuring that this estimating
capability is fully and effectively applied by the source
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selection authority. I feel that within the Services this
is an item to which you should give priority attention. I
would therefore like within the very near future to discuss
with each of you your proposed actions and program that you
feel will improve the program cost estimating capability in
your Service. In addition to the Service action there is
also needed an independent OSD capability to validate these
cost estimates.
In my recent reviews of the histories of a number of major
programs, I have noted that another major contributor to
cost growth consists of changes which we make in a program
during both the development phase and the production phase.
While I know there is a valid need for some changes, much
improvement is possible In this area. Many of the changes
of the type currently being made can be and must be avoided.
This can' be accomplished, in part, first by assuring that
we do a better and more complete job of defining what we
really need in a system before entering full-scale develop-
ment and, second, by the vigorous review and elimination of
the many "nice" or "desirable" features which so often creep
into these systems as they proceed through development and
production. I therefore am requesting that each of you take
action in the area of the establishment of military require-
ments to assure that better system definition is in fact
accomplished before programs are submitted to the Secretary
of Defense ' \. ] for ' * " . ale development; th I
increased emphasis be given to the implementation of tl
recently established program for configuration management
and control; and that no changes be approved without an
accurate knowledge of the impact of the cost of the change
on the total program cost.
My reviews have also indicated a third major reason for cost
growth which is to some degree associate he above
two points. This is that we have not adequately identified
the risks associated with major programs and in fact in
most cases we have not done a thorough job in completing
the prerequisites to contract definition which are currently
called for. In our desire to enter into these programs we
have often shortcut some of these prerequisites and have not
adequately completed the advanced development necessary to
reduce the major risk areas to the point where it will be
manageable in full-scale 'development . This often results
in the necessity, in the middle of a large development
effort, of going back and accomplishing work that should
have been done beforehand, with, of course, the accompany-
ing disruption of schedule and increase in program cost.
I would, therefore, like each of you to focus more attention
on this matter and assure that; during concept formulation:




Formal risk analysis on each program is made;
Summaries of these are made part of the back-up material
for the program.
Although not directly associated with the cost "growth aspect
of weapon system acquisition, there are two other items
which I think are clear enough and important enough to men-
tion here.
The first item relates to the use of competitive prototypes
in our acquisition process, as well as the use of brassboard
or other design validation techniques which may not be com-
petitive. I feel that we will benefit by increasing depend-
ence on hardware demonstration and competition, with some
corresponding reduction in dependence on paper analyses.
This must be done with recognition of the differences in
susceptibility of different types and sizes of systems to
this treatment; however, I am convinced that there are
distinct benefits to be gained by a judicious increase in
our use of hardware in the weapons acquisition process.
The second item relates to what I consider to be a general
deficiency in the i of test and evalu; I ' we perform
on a developmental weapon system before we commit signifi-
cant resources to production. While it is generally, in my
opinion, a mistake to edule a complete break " . :-en
development and production coi. fci :nt, we have tei I to
drift too far in the direction of concurrency, and this must
be reversed.
I would like to have, at your early convenience, your com-
.ts en t] -.;• • "an to. put into effect th< i atters
of guidance I have discussed above. .. reviewing your
answers I will conclude whether further direction or policy














Department of Defense Directive
SUBJECT: Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
I. PURPOSE
This Directive establishes policy for major defense system
acquisition in the Military Departments and Defense Agencies
(referred to as DoD Components).
II. APPLICATION
This Directive applies to major programs, so designated
by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense
(referred to as SecDef). This designation shall consider
(I) dollar value (programs which have an estimated RDT&E
cost in excess of 50 million dollars, or an estimated Pro-
duction cost in excess of 200 million dollars); (2) national
urgency; (3) recommendations by DoD Component Heads or
Cilice of Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials. In addition,
the management principles in this Directive are applicable
to all programs.
III. POLICY
A. Mode of Operation - Successful development, production
and deployment of major defense systems are primarily
dependent upon competent people, rational priorities and
clearly defined responsibilities. Responsibility and
authority for the acquisition of major defense systems
shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent
consistent with the urgency and importance of each pro-
gram. The development and production of a major defense
system shall be managed by a single individual (program
manager) who shall have a charter which provides suffic-
ient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives
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Layers of authority between the program manager and his Component
Head shall be minimum. For programs involving two or more Com-
ponents, the Component having dominant interest shall designate the
program manager, and his charter shall be approved by the cognizant
official within OSD. The assignment and tenure of program managers
shall be a matter of concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect
career incentives designed to attract, retain and reward competent
personnel.
1. The DoD Components are responsible for identifying needs and
defining, developing and producing systems to satisfy those needs.
Component Heads are also responsible for contractor source'
selection unless otherwise specified by the SecDef on a specific
program.
2. The OSD is responsible for (a) establishing acquisition policy,
(b) assuring that major defense system programs are pursued in
response to valid needs and (c) evaluating policy implementation
on each approved program.
3. The OSD and DoD Components are responsible for program monitor-
ing, but will place minimum demands for formal reporting on the
program manager. Nonrecurring needs for information will be kept
to a minimum and handled informally.
4. The SecDef will make the decisions which initiate program commit-
ments or increase those commitments. He may redirect a program
because of an actual or threatened breach of a program threshold
stated in an approved Development Concept Paper (DCP). The DCP
and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (1 ill
support the SecDef deci sion-making. These decisions will be
reflected in the next submission of the Program Objective Memo-
randum. (POM) by the DoD Component.
B. Conduct of Program - Because every program is different, successful
program conduct requires that sound judgment be applied in using the
management principles of this Directive. Underlying specific defense
system developments is the need for a strong and usable technology
base. This base will be maintained by conducting research and advanced
technology effort independent of specific defense systems development.
Advanced technology effort includes prototyping, preferably using small,
efficient design teams and a minimum amount of documentation. The
objective is to obtain significant advances in technology at minimum cost.
I. Program Initiation
a. Early conceptual effort is normally conducted at the discretion





determines that a major defense system program should be
pursued. It is crucial that the right decisions be made during
this conceptual effort; wrong decisions create problems not
easily overcome later in the program. Therefore, each DoD
Component will designate a single individual, such as the
Assistant Secretary for R&D, to be responsible for conceptual
efforts on new major programs.
b. The considerations which support the determination of the need
for a system program, together with a plan for that program,
will be documented in the DCP. The DCP will define program
issues, including special logistics problems, program objectives,
program plans, performance parameters, areas of major risk,
system alternatives and acquisition strategy. The DCP will be
prepared by the DoD Component, following an agreement between
OSD and that Component on a DCP outline. The Director, Defense
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)(or the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Telecommunications) for his programs) has the basic
responsibility for coordination of inputs for the DCP and its
submittal to the DSARC for consideration and to the SecDef for
subsequent decision, if approved, the program will be conducted
within the DCP thresholds.
2. Full-Scale Development. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that program worth and readiness warrant commitment of
resources to full-scale development, it will request a Sec! ci-
sion to procco , the DSARC ormally r
program progress and suitability to enter this phase and will forward
its recommendations to the SecDef for final decision. Such review
will confirm (a) the need for the selected defense system in consider-
ation of threat, system alternatives, special logistics needs, estimates
of development costs, preliminary estimates of life cycle costs and
potential benefits in context with overall DoD strategy and fiscal
guidance; (b) that development risks have been identified and solutions
are in hand; and (c) realism of the plan for full-scale development.
3. Production/Deployment. When the DoD Component is sufficiently
confident that engineering is complete and that commitment of sub-
stantial resources to production and deployment is warranted, it
will request a SecDef decision to proceed. At that time, the DSARC
will again review program progress and suitability to enter substantial
production/deployment and forward its recommendations to the SecDef
for final decision. Such review will confirm (a) the need for producing
the defense system in consideration of threat, estimated acquisition
and ownership costs and potential benefits in context with overall DoD
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strategy and fiscal guidance; (b) that a practical engineering design,
with adequate consideration of production and logistics problems is
complete; (c) that all previously identified technical uncertainties
have been resolved and that operational suitability has been deter-
mined by test and evaluation; and (d) the realism of the plan for the
remainder of the program. Some production funding for long lead
material or effort may be required prior to the production decision.
In such cases, the SecDef will decide whether a DSARC review and
revised DCP are required. In any event, full production go-ahead
will be authorized by approval of the DCP.
C. Program Considerations
1. System need shall be clearly stated in operational terms, with appro-
priate limits, and shall be challenged throughout the acquisition
process. Statements of need/performance requirements shall be
matched where possible with existing technology. Wherever feasible,
operational needs shall be satisfied through use of existing military
or commercial hardware. When need can be s ti ified only through
new development, the equivalent needs of the other DoD Components
shall be considered to guard against unnecessary proliferation.
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consider the cost of
acquisition and ownership; discrete cost elements (e.g., unit pro-
duction cost, operating and support cost) shall be translated into
"design to" requirements. System development shall be continuously
evaluated agai: ese requir
applied to technical requirements. I :ai tradeoffs shall be made
between system capability, cost and schedule. Traceability of esti-
mates and costing factors, including those for economic escalation,
shall be maintained.
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a principal design para-
meter with the magnitude, scope and level of this effort in keeping
with the program phase. Early development effort will consider only
those parameters that are truly necessary to basic defense system
design, e. g. , those logistic problems that have significant impact on
system readiness, capability or cost. Premature introduction of
detailed operational support considerations is to be avoided.
4. Programs shall be structured and resources allocated to ensure that
the demonstration of actual achievement of program objectives is the
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risk and worth shall be thereby established. Schedules shall be
subject to trade-off as much as any other program constraint.
Schedules and funding profiles shall be structured to accommodate
unforeseen problems and permit task accomplishment without
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
5. Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed. Progressive
commitments of resources which incur program risk will be made
only when confidence in program outcome is sufficiently high to
warrant going ahead. Models, mock-ups and system hardware will
be used to the greatest possible extent to increase confidence level.
6. Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible. A deter-
mination of operational suitability, including logistic support
requirements, will be made prior to large-scale production commit-
ments, making use of the most realistic test environment possible
and the best representation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be evaluated and presented
to the DSARC at the time of the production decision.
7. Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics
including risk. It is not possible to determine the precise production
cost of a new complex defense system before it is developed; therefore,
such systems will not be procured using the total package procurement
concept or production options that are contractually priced in the
development contract. type : : ontracts are prefers
where substantia.1 development effort is involved. Letter contracts
shall be minimized. When risk is reduced to the extent that realistic,
pricing can occur, fixed-price type contracts should be issued. Changes
shall be limited to those that are necessary or offer significant benefit
to the DoD. Where change orders are necessary, they shall be con-
tractually priced or subject to an established ceiling before authoriza-
tion, except in patently impractical cases.
8. The source selection decision shall take into account the contractor's
capability to develop a necessary defense system on a timely and
cost-effective basis. The DoD Component shall have the option of
deciding whether or not the contract will be completely negotiated
before a program decision is made. Solicitation documents shall
require contractor identification of uncertainties and specific pro-
posals for their resolution. Solicitation and evaluation of proposals
should be planned to minimize contractor expense. Proposals for
cost-type or incentive contracts may be penalized during evaluation
to the degree that the proposed cost is unreali stically low.
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9. Management information/program control requirements shall provide
information which is essential to effective management control.
Such information should be generated from data actually utilized by-
contractor operating personnel and provided in summarized form for
successively higher level management and monitoring requirements.
A single, realistic work breakdown structure (WBS) shall be developed
for each program to provide a consistent framework for (a) planning
and assignment of responsibilities, (b) control and reporting of pro-
gress, and (c) establishing a data base for estimating the future cost
of defense systems. Contractor management information/program
control systems, and reports emanating therefrom, shall be utilized
to the maximum extent practicable. Government imposed changes to
contractor systems shall consist of only those necessary to satisfy
established DoD-wide standards. Documentation shall be generated
in the minimum amount to satisfy necessary and specific management
needs.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
1. Each DoD Component will implement this Directive within 90 days and
forward two (2) copies of each implementing document to the SecDef.
2. The number of implementing documents will be minimized and necessary
procedural guidance consolidated to the e reatest extent possible. Selected
subjects to be covered by DoD Directives /Instructions or joint Service/
Agency documents in support of this Directive are listed in Enclosure 1.
Each DoD Component will forward the joint Service/Agency documents
for which it is responsible to the SecDef for approval prior to issuance.





5000. 1 (Encl 1)
Jul 13, 71
RELATED POLICY
Responsibility for the following policy documents is assigned to the
Cognizant Office indicated. In each case, the Cognizant Office shall
(a) generate the policy, or (b) delegate authority to a lead DoD
Component for preparation and subsequent issue of a joint Service/
Agency regulation, agreement or guide after approval by OSD.
Policy Subject
The DoD Technology Base
The DCP and the DSARC
Defense System Engineering





































THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D C 70301
MY 28, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Director of Defense Research h Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
The General Counsel
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of Defense Agencies
SUBJECT: Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition
We have been considering within the Department, for over a year,
ways by which we can improve acquisition programs for major weapon
systems. Some steps have been taken which I believe are in the right
direction (reference my July 31, 1969 memorandum), and it is now ap-
propriate to move ahead in a concerted effort to firmly establish addi-
tional new policies and to implement them.
The prime objective of the new policy guidance is to enable the
Services to improve their management of programs. Improvement in
the execution of these programs will be made to the extent the Services
are willing and able to improve their management practices. The
Services have the responsibility to get the job done. It is imperative-
that they do the job better in the future than it has been done in the past.
It is the responsibility of the OSD to approve the policies which
the Services are to follow, to evaluate the performance of the Services
in implementing the approved policies and to make decisions on pro-
ceeding into the next phase in each major acquisition program.
The purpose of this memorandum is to issue broad policy guidance
which is to be translated into appropriate action by all Services and




Management in the Services will be improved only to the extent
that capable people with the right kind of experience and training are
designated to manage these major programs -- in fact all programs.
In order to be effective, program managers must be given adequate
authority to make decisions on major questions relating to the program
both in the conceptual development stage and in the full-scale development
stage. If capable people are going to be willing to undertake these impor-
tant program management assignments, ways must be found to give them
some incentive to do so. Program managers must be given more recog-
nition toward career advancement in all of the Services, and good managers
must be rewarded just as good operational people are rewarded.
If our people are to develop the experience necessary for program
management and are to utilize their experience, they must be assigned
to a given program long enough to be effective.
The overall structure of the program management function in all
Services needs to be considered. Changes must be made to minimize
the numerous layers of authority between the program manager and the
Service Secretary.
The entire management problem needs to be addressed under
these simple guidelines: put more capable people into program manage-
ment, give them the responsibility and the authority and keep them there
long enough to get the job done right.
Develooment
The cost of developing and acquiring new weapon systems is more
dependent upon making practical trade-offs between the stated operating
requirements and engineering design than upon any other factor. This
must be the key consideration at every step in development from the
conceptual stage until the new weapon goes into the force.
The program schedule (structure) is another very key considera-
tion. It must make sense. It must allow time for accomplishing im-
portant task objectives without unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
The ideal schedule is sequential with enough slack time for resolution




It is crucial that the right decisions be made during the concep-
tual stage. If wrong decisions are made during this period the problems
that are generated cannot easily be overcome later in the program.
Any new program will contain some risk that the technology in-
volved cannot, within reasonable time and cost constraints, be converted
into practical engineering design which meets the desired operating
requirements. There are three ways in which this technical risk can
be minimized:
1. R isk Assessment. The first is to make a careful as-
sessment of the technical problems involved and a judgment as
to how much effort is likely to be necessary in finding a solution
that is practical. A careful look at the consequence of failure,
even of "low risk" program elements, is also critical.
2. System and Hardware Proofing. The second and only
sure way to minimize the technical risk is to do enough actual
engineering design and component testing in the conceptual de-
velopment stage to demonstrate that the technical risks have
been eliminated or reduced to a reasonable level. Comnonent
or complete system prototyping, or backup development, are
examples of this.
3* Trade-offs (risk avoidance ). Since program risk and
cost are dependent on practical trade-offs between stated operating
requirements neering d -offs must be con-
sidered not only at the beginning of the program but continually
throughout the development stage.
Proposals for OSD approval of development programs shall in-
clude a description of how the Service or Agency intends to manage the
program to include appropriate attention to (1) Risk Assessment ; (2) System
and Hardware Proofing; (3) Tradeoffs. When a DCP is prepared, it shall
reflect these in the management plan.
Small development projects which do not require specific OSD
approval shall also be structured to reflect these considerations.
All new programs will be kept in the conceptual development stages
until the responsible Service secretary r.nd the OSD can be assured that





Authorization to proceed into full-scale development will be given
by OSD based upon a DCP and the recommendation of the DSARC. In
making this recommendation, the DSARC shall consider in particular
whether adequate risk reduction has been accomplished.
Even though risk has been adequately addressed during the con-
ceptual development stages, full-scale development will uncover technical
and engineering problems that need to be solved. Procedures shall be
established in the development program by which these problems will
be continually addressed in view of possible trade-offs v/ith stated opera-
ting requirements, cost, and operational readiness date.
Furthermore, it is essential to have assurance that those problems
encountered during the earlier development stages have in fact been solved.
This requires that milestones be established to demonstrate achievement
of objectives at appropriate points in the development program. These
milestones shall include such things as completion of appropriate stages
in the overall system design and testing of critical items of hardware,
e. g. , subsystems and components.
Consideration must be given in development to all matters neces-
sary in a full operating system. This will include such things as
maintenance, logistic support, training, etc. However, where these
matters are dependent on the final production design, as much of this
wo rk as possible should be delayed until the prod uction sta ge. In general,
RFPs for the development stage should be carefully reviewed to eliminate
demands for report?, documentation and work tasks which are not absolutely
necessary for the efficient accompli sliment of the actual development work.
These considerations and demands must be limited to those which directly
contribute to the design of the system itself.
Production
The most important consideration before moving into full-scale
production on a new weapon system is to have assurance that the engineering
design is completed, that all major problems have been resolved, and this
has been demonstrated to the extent practical by actual performance testing.
At the DSARC review when the decision is made as to whether to
proceed into full production, I want the responsible Service to certify that
the following actions have been taken:.
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1. All of the milestones which demonstrate the achieve-
ment of a practical engineering design have been met.
2. All important engineering problems encountered
during the development have been resolved with appropriate
trade-offs with stated operating requirements so that the
production, maintenance and operating costs are optimized.
The start up of production must be scheduled to minimize financial
commitments until it has been demonstrated that all major development
problems have been resolved. In most cases production engineering
and production tooling are necessary to demonstrate that the engineering
has been satisfactorily accomplished. It may also be necessary to de-
velop and demonstrate new production processes, methods and procedures,
Thus, so-me limited expenditure on production may have to overlap de-
velopment.
Contracts
In all our contracting, the type of contract must be tailored to the
risks involved. Cost plus incentive contracts are preferred for both
advanced development and full scale development contracts for major
systems. When the assessment of technical risk permits, such contracts
should include provisions for competitive fixed price subcontracts for
subsystems, components and materials. In many cases this will enable
a major portion of the program to benefit from competition. When risks
have been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can take place, fixed-
price type contracts should be used. But the contracting officer should
have the flexibility to consider the technical capability of the contractor
and other factors in selection of contract type. When fixed-price type
contracts are used for development programs, the contractor's financial
ability to absorb losses that might be incurred must be a factor in making
the award.
It is, of course, desirable to award a fixed-price contract in a
competitive environment. It has been proven to be difficult or impossible
to achieve effective competition in a fixed-price contract for production for
a major weapon system before full-scale development has been undertaken.
Consideration should therefore be given to the use of a negotiated fixed-price
contract after the development has progressed to the point that the produc-
tion design can be realistically specified. To the extent possible, a contract
negotiated under these circumstances should encourage competition for
subsystems, components and materials. In this way a substantial part
of the cost can be established in a competitive environment.
100

The L'se of letter contracts should be minimized. Change orders
should not be authorized until they have been contractually priced, or
until contractual ceilings have been established.
This guidance is provided to the Services with the understanding
that it is to be implemented within the established DCP and DSARC
policies. Other reports and reviews are to be kept to a minimum, but
the lines of communication between OSD offices and Service components
must be kept open to insure actual programs are being implemented under
this guidance.
To the extent that the above guidance conflicts with existing DoD
Directives and Instructions, the policies stated herein will govern. Since
these policies should be applied immediately, I would appreciate your
distributing this memorandum to key personnel, including all program
managers, involved in the acquisition of major weapon systems.
I want the appropriate regulations of OSD and the Services and
Agencies to be changed or cancelled to reflect these policies. I have asked
the DDR&E to take the leadership in accomplishing this and have suggested










MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
SUBJECT : Establishment of a Defense Systems Acquisition
Review Council
I have been reviewing for some time current practices within
the Department of Defense for the acquisition of major
systems. My r . ./ has high] .. bhe importance of cur
organization and practices for accomplishing this management
job. The primary responsibility for the acquisition ond
1 t of cur major systems must resl
Services. Within each Service, this responsibility is fo-
cused in the Project Manager. Recognizing the Service res-
ponsibility, I am, at the same time, most anxious of
insuring, before we a; ; transitioning through the criti-
cal milestones of the acquisition of a major system, that
all facets of the acqui
considered
.
Toward this end, I am establishing a Defense Systems Acqui-
sition Review Council (DSARC) within the Office, Secretary
of Defense, to advise me of the status and readiness of
each major system to proceed to the next phase of effort
in its life cycle. The Council will serve to complement
the Development Concept Paper (DCP) system, which continues
as a formal DOD management and decision-making system for
the acquisition of major systems. The Council will evaluate
the status of each candidate system at three basic milestone
points: First, when the sponsoring Service desires to
initiate Contract Definition (or equivalent effort); second,
when it is desired to go from Contract Definition to full
scale development; and third, when it is desired to transi-
tion from development to production for Service deployment.
The functions of the Council are separate from and do not
encompass the management reviews of major systems which I
have previously requested and which are being conducted by
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DDR&E with assistance from ASD(I&L) and ASD(Comp.). These
reviews are focused on the management of the system whereas
the DSARC reviews will cover all issues, program thresholds
and other matters normally treated in DCP ' s . Also, the
management reviews will normally be held only once on each
major system; whereas the DSARC reviews, which are based on
program milestones, will be normally conducted three or
more times during the acquisition cycle of a particular
system.
The membership of the Council will include DDR&E, ASD(I&L)
,
ASD(C), and ASD(SA). For the first two milestone reviews,
that is, prior to entry into contract definition and prior
to entry into full scale development, the Council will be
chaired by the DDR&E. For the third review, related to the
transition from development to production, the Council will
be chaired by the ASD(I&L).
I am initially defining major systems, which will be subject
to Council reviews, to include (1) those for which Develop-
ment Concept Papers are required; and (2) those specifically
designated by me for review and evaluation. A tentative
charter for the Council is attached as an enclosure. I
desire that the DDR&E and ASD(I&L) , within the next 30 days
jointly prepare the necessary procedures and take the neces-
sary administrative actions to implement the Council
ch rter.
I believe the Council operation will result in improved
management and will augment the decision-making process
within the Department of Defense. I cannot over-emphasize
the need for complete interface throughout h Department in







Defense System Acquisition Review Council
1. Purpose
This charter prescribes the mission, functions, composi-
tion, authority and responsibility, and administration






The mission of the DSARC is to review major and impor-
tant Department of Defense system acquisition programs
at appropriate milestone points in their life cycle.
These reviews are intended to permit coordinated evalua-
tion and deliberation among senior managers, based on
the most complete presentation of information available
to assure that aavice given the Secretary of Defense i
as complete and objective as possible prior to a decision
to proceed to the next step of the system's life cycle.
te DSARC operation Luaticns will s rv to comple-
ment the DCP system which remains as a formal DOD
management and decision-making system concerning the
acquisition process of major defense systems.
3
.
Func t i on
s
a. The DSARC will revic ate the status of
each appropriate system acquisition program at three
basic milestone points
:
First : When initiation of Contract Definition (or
equivalent effort) is proposed;
Second : When transition from the Contract Definition
phase to full-scale development is proposed;
and
Third: When transition from the development phase
into production for Service deployment is
proposed.
b. The first review will support the basic DCP in that
it will provide a forum for discussion and possible
resolution of the various viewpoints of the partici-
pating principals, including the Secretary of the
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Military Service sponsoring the program. The later
reviews will serve a function of validating the
readiness of a system to proceed to the next stage,




The DSARC will consist of the DDR&E, the ASD(ISL), the
ASD (Comptroller) and the ASD(SA) .
5 Authority and Responsibilities
a. For consideration of entry into Contract Definition
(Contract Definition Phase) and entry into full-
scale development (the full-scale development phase),
the DSARC will be chaired by the DDR&E.
b. For the transition from development to production
(the production phase), the DSARC will be chaired
by the ASD(I&L)
.
c. For additional reviews, the DSARC will be chaired by
DDR . the AS I&L) as appropriate, : : ; ling on
whether the action under consideration is concerned
with movement within the full-scale development
phase or into or v; ti produci
d. Reviews at points other than program transition
points may be requested by a DSARC member by memoran-
dum to the appropriate chairman.
Rev: of a prcg^-- in ] .e
may be directed by the Secretary o
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
f. Reviews will be limited to major and important pro-
grams. These are (1) those for which Development
Concept Papers are required; and (2) those specifi-
cally designated for review by the Secretary of '
Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the
appropriate DSARC chairman.
g. Aspects to be considered by the DSARC include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) For items proposed for Contract Definition :
(a) Justification of military need;





(c) Relative capability compared with present/




(e) Validity of cost estimates and analysis of
cost risks involved;
(f) Validity of proposed scheduling and considera-
tion of alternatives thereto;
(g) Validity of proposed procurement methodology,
including type of contractor structure, kind
of contract, timing of Government production
commitment, means of assuring competition; and




For items proposed for transition from Contract
Definition into full-scale development:
(a) Continued validity of program obj >1 Lves and
validity of changes thereto since completion
of concept formulation;
(b) Confidence in ach: . rig current program
objectives
;
(c) Analysis of current risks;
(d) Te ' ' . risks as; tl :-
and , . ' . . re of
;
(e) Adequacy of integrated logistics support
planning;
(f) Validity of cost estimates, including analysis
of cost differences between competing Contract
Definition contractors and Government estimates;
(g) Options associated with cost trade-offs and
analysis thereof;
(h) Adequate consideration of contract incentives
and inducement for competition; and
(i) Validity of contractor proposals.
( 3 For systems proposed for initial production :
(a) Feasibility of production, including evaluation
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of milestone achievements, test results
and production line producibility
;
(b) Technical feasibility, including specifi-
cation requirements;
(c) Review and evaluate overall requirement;
(d) Current validity of cost estimates;
(e) Need, an appropriate, for concurrent
development and production as well as
validity of recommended time phasing of
production/deployment aspects;
(f) Adequacy of integrated logistic support
planning;
(g) The existence of adequate project manage-
mant controls;
(h) Adequate planning for Government-furnished
equipment and facilities; and
(1) Adequate planning as to proprietary rights
items
.
h. The Chairman may invite other staff members, such as
the ASD(M&RA) and the ASD(ISA) to participate in the
reviews when the reviews have significant relevance
to their responsibilities.
i. . I - Chair: LI advise one Depu'. of
Defense of the findings and recommendations of the
specific review and concurrently a copy of the find-
ings and recommendations will be forwarded to the
appropriate Service Secretary.
6 . Administration
The DSARC may establish necessary Working Groups to
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